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UNWELCOME IMPORTS: RACISM, SEXISM,
AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT
William H. Lash III*
INTRODUCTION
From the acquisition of Rockefeller Center's radio tower' to the
purchase of the manicured greens of Pebble Beach golf course, 2 for-
eign direct investment in the United States has captured the attention
and imagination of the U.S. public and its elected officials. Many
Americans do not welcome the current wave of foreign direct invest-
ment,3 despite the stated pro-investment policy of the current adminis-
tration4 and past U.S. policy.5 Responses to foreign direct investment
have included legislative action to stop or limit foreign direct invest-
ment 6 and an uproar of angry voices calling for protectionism. 7 Such
responses challenge the view that foreign direct investment benefits the
United States. Critics of foreign direct investment often raise national
security as a reason for barring foreign direct investment in many in-
dustries. 8 While this national debate rages, certain voices are being
* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Yale University, B.A. (1982);
Harvard University, J.D. (1985). Member, District of Columbia and New Jersey bars; former
Counsel to the Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission. The author would like to
thank Leland Ware, Alan Weinberger, and Sharon Zackula for their comments on earlier drafts
of this article and to acknowledge the research assistance of Rebecca Whitfield.
1. See ROCKEFELLER CENTER PROPERTIES, INC., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 2-3 (1990).
2. Karen L. Miller et al., The Stealth Investor Who Snagged Pebble Beach, Bus. WK., Sept.
24, 1990, at 124.
3. Sixty-eight percent of Americans polled rank Japanese economic might as a greater threat
to the United States than the Soviet military. "hat Americans Think of Japan, Bus. WK., Aug.
7, 1989, at 51.
4. UNITED STATES PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC REPORT 124 (Feb. 1990).
5. Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States Investment Obligations in Con-
flict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989).
6. S. 2516, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990) (improving the quality of international data com-
piled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis to track foreign direct investment in the United
States); H.R. 4520, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990); H.R. 2386, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.
2445, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
7. John Burgess, Dukakis Keys in on Foreign Investment, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1988, at Cl;
see also Shiro Yoneyama, News Focus: Bentsen, Quayle Clash Over Foreign Investment, Kyodo
News Service, Oct. 6, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
8. In response to growing public concerns over foreign direct investment in the United
States, Congress enacted the Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950 as
part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (amending Title
VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 2151). Pursuant to Exon-Florio, the
President had the authority, without judicial review, to review and block mergers, acquisitions,
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ignored in the chorus calling for restrictions on foreign direct invest-
ment. Because racism and sexism are common in many countries,
U.S. minorities and women face a particular threat that such attitudes
may be brought to the United States by foreign investors. Foreign
investors with racist and sexist views discriminate against minorities
and women in hiring and business relationships, denying them the op-
portunity to share in the benefits of international investment.
This article will address the problems minorities and women face
from Japanese foreign direct investment.9 This article focuses on Jap-
anese direct investment because the rapid rise in Japan's direct invest-
ment in the United States, combined with a record of discrimination
by Japanese firms in Japan and abroad, makes Japanese investment the
best example of the problems addressed in this article. However, the
discriminatory attitudes described here may well be held by other for-
eign investors, and therefore, the legislation proposed later in this arti-
cle addresses a broader problem.
Part I will discuss racism and sexism in Japan. Analysis of Japa-
nese attitudes toward minorities and women in Japan can shed light
on the types of attitudes, and perhaps indifference to discrimination,
that the Japanese bring with them to their U.S. investments. Part II
will discuss the manifestations of Japanese racism and sexism in the
United States. Part III will propose conditioning new foreign direct
investment in the United States upon approval by an interagency com-
mittee of a plan by the investing corporation to provide employment,
training, and promotional opportunities for groups that have histori-
cally been the victims of discrimination. In addition, under this pro-
posal foreign investors who already have investments in the United
States and who are found in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,10 the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986,11 the
antiboycott regulations of the Export Administration Act of 1979,12 or
other similar legislation will face scrutiny before being allowed to
make further investments in the United States.
or takeovers of U.S. firms by foreign persons if they threatened to impair "national security."
Exon-Florio lapsed in November of 1990, but there have been recent moves to reauthorize and
expand it further. See infra note 287.
9. Recently, discrimination cases have also been brought by non-minority U.S. employees
who assert that they have been passed up for promotion or fired and replaced by Japanese em-
ployees. See infra action against Ricoh Corporation, p. 127. While this article focuses on
problems faced by U.S. minorities and women, proposed legislation might also address national
origin discrimination against all Americans.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-el5 (1988).
11. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-16 (1988). The implementing regulations can be found in 31 C.F.R.
§ 545.
12. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2403-20 (1988).
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I. DISCRIMINATION IN JAPAN
A. Racism in Japan
No discussion of discrimination in Japan can begin without a brief
examination of Japanese history and Japan's view of foreigners. The
Japanese have long prided themselves on having a homogeneous cul-
ture. Many prominent Japanese political and business leaders point to
their homogeneity as a reason for Japan's rapid economic successes.' 3
Based perhaps on a combination of geography and national policy, the
Japanese historically have had little exposure to foreign cultures.1
4
Europeans, primarily Portuguese merchants and missionaries, first vis-
ited Japan in the 1540s. The Japanese maintained an intermittent pat-
tern of contact and trade with Europeans for nearly a century before
Japanese leaders determined that Western influences, particularly
Christianity, presented a threat to Japanese culture.' 5 From 1638 un-
til 1853, Japan closed its borders to the outside world. 16 In 1853 Ja-
pan opened its ports and borders at the insistence of Commodore
Matthew Perry who was accompanied by one-fourth of the U.S. Navy.
By 1858 the threat of combined British and U.S. naval power suc-
ceeded in opening Japan's borders to i series of trade treaties with
Western States. '7
Thus, Japan did not have extensive foreign relations nor did it
13. Sony President Akio Morita observes that "the Japanese, who are a homogenous people,
were able to cooperate to provide for their common welfare." AKIO MORITA ET AL., MADE IN
JAPAN 137 (1987). Former Prime Minister Nakasone has also stated that "tihere are no minor-
ity races in Japan." Sixty percent of Ainu Say Discrimination Exists, Kyodo News Service, Nov.
7, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
14. For more than 2000 years, until the end of World War II, Japan was free of foreign
invasions. T.W. KANG, GAISHI: THE FOREIGN COMPANY IN JAPAN, at xi, xviii (1990).
15. The Jesuit missionaries had enjoyed spectacular success in winning converts, with nearly
a half-million Japanese becoming Christians. The rapid rise of a foreign religion with foreign
leaders was seen as a threat to Japanese culture. EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE 64, 68
(1978). Eventually, in 1614, Christianity was outlawed. In the "Christian rebellion" of 1637-38
almost all of the 37,000 Japanese Christians were executed. IAN NISH, A SHORT HISTORY OF
JAPAN 59 (1968).
16. REISCHAUER, supra note 15, at 32. An exception to the isolationist policies of Japan
during this era was carved out for Dutch merchants, who were permitted to maintain trading
posts in Nagasaki, on the southernmost Japanese island of Kyushu. Id. at 68, 74; see also Japan,
History of, 11 ACADEMIC AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 367, 369 (1989). The Dutch were permit-
ted to stay in Japan, under a system of controlled trade, by agreeing not to carry Christians
aboard Dutch ships to Japan and agreeing to report any spread of Christianity to the Japanese
government. As a condition of their residency in Japan, Dutch merchants had to demonstrate
they were not missionaries by engaging infumi-e, a ritualistic trampling on the image of Christ.
NISH, supra note 15, at 61.
17. REISCHAUER, supra note 15, at 78-79. All Japanese did not quietly comply with the
militarily-imposed trade treaties. Terrorist campaigns against Westerners under the cry "sonno
jof7' or "honor the emperor and expel the barbarians" were mounted. Id. at 80.
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enter into treaties with foreign states from the 700s to the 1850s.18
Currently, language and Japanese ethnocentrism contribute to the cul-
tural barriers between Japan and the world. 19
Japanese xenophobic attitudes are somewhat ironic considering
that the Japanese were not the original inhabitants of Japan. Japan
was originally occupied by the Ainu, a group that is physically and
linguistically distinguishable from the Japanese. 20 The Ainu now re-
side predominantly in Hokkaido, in northern Japan, and remain, as do
other ethnic groups in Japan, the victims of discrimination. 21 Approx-
imately 24,300 Ainu live in Hokkaido, and the majority of Ainu report
discrimination. 22 Although the Japanese have imposed assimilation
on the Ainu, the Ainu are discriminated against in marriage and
employment. 23
1. Japanese Discrimination Against the Burakumin
Perhaps the most historic victims of discrimination in Japan are
the Burakumin or "hamlet people."'24 The continuing discrimination
against the Burakumin may be the most indicative sign of Japanese
tolerance of, and indifference toward, widespread discrimination. The
Burakumin are ethnic Japanese who are the victims of a caste system
steeped in Buddhism and Shintoism.21 Shintoism was formerly the
18. Hosokawa Kigoshi, Japanese Nationality in International Perspective, in NATIONALITY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 177, 179 (Ko S. Sik ed., 1990).
19. Japanese is spoken only in Japan and the inability of many foreigners to read and write
Japanese poses many communication problems. An additional source of tension and misunder-
standing between Japan and other States is the Japanese belief of cultural uniqueness. KANG,
supra note 14, at xxi. Because many Japanese believe that they are a culturally unique people,
they also assume that non-Japanese cannot comprehend this culture. Id.
20. Takashi Oka, Japanese Claims of Homogeneity Backfire, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 7, 1986, at 1. The word ainu means "human being" in the Ainu language. The Ainu are
believed to be genetically linked to the Urals and Siberian Taiga regions. The Ainu physically
are more hirsute, have flatter faces, deeper-set eyes, and longer noses than the Japanese.
21. See Stefan Wagstyl, Japan's Lower Caste Faces Prejudice, FIN. TIMES, May 11, 1988, at
17; Oka, supra note 20, at 9; Shiro Yoneyama, Asia Gets Mixed U.S. Reviews on Human Rights
Records, Kyodo News Service, Feb. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
22. Sixty Percent of Ainu Say Discrimination Exists, supra note 13.
23. Prime Minister Nakasone stated, "There are no minority races in Japan and therefore
there is no discrimination .... The Ainu people have already intermingled with the Japanese
people." Id. In the 1970s, the Ainu Liberation Movement engaged in a series of terrorist bomb-
ings. However, these attacks were apparently made by Japanese radicals and not by the Ainu.
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, JAPAN, A COUNTRY STUDY 274 (Fre-
derica M. Bunge ed., 1983).
24. REISCHAUER, supra note 15, at 36. Burakumin translates into " ' hamlet people,' a con-
traction of 'people of special hamlets,'" referring to the villages where the Burakumin live. Id.
25. Until relatively recently, the majority of Japanese denied that the Burakumin were in fact
ethnically Japanese. In a survey conducted by the Japanese government in 1965, 70% of the
Japanese respondents indicated that they believed that the Burakumin were not Japanese and
that they constituted a distinct and different race. MIKIso HANE, PEASANTS, REBELS AND
OUTCASTE: THE UNDERSIDE OF MODERN JAPAN 139-40 (1982).
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national religion of Japan. 26 A key tenet of Shintoism requires ritual
cleansing and purification of people, places, and things.27 Shintoism
considers human and animal corpses as impure, and the persons who
deal with their disposal as unclean.28 Similarly, Buddhism condemns
the taking ,of lives and the killing of animals.29 With the introduction
of Buddhism to Japan in the sixth century, tasks such as the execution
of criminals, the butchering of animals, and the tanning of leather
were classified as unclean. 30
During the Tokugawa Era31_ the ancestors of today's Burakumin
drifted into these roles and were shunned by the rest of Japanese soci-
ety. Burakumin faced discrimination in marriage and housing, and
were denied all but the most menial employment. 32 Also during this
era many Japanese villages adopted Jim Crow-type segregation of the
Burakumin. Burakumin were not allowed to eat, drink, or bathe with
peasants; to purchase land without the permission of village officials;
to borrow money; or to."step out of line."' 33 Peasants who had rela-
tions with the Burakumin faced ostracism or punishment.
34
After the restoration of the Meiji Emperor 35 in 1868, the
Burakumin were to be fully integrated into Japanese society under a
plan similar to that proposed for newly freed slaves during the Recon-
struction Period in the United States. The promises proved to be
short-lived, however. Japanese peasants were not prepared to accept
26. Shinto, "the way of the Gods," is one of Japan's three major religions (along with Bud-
dhism and Christianity). Shinto features several gods and the deification of national leaders who
are worshipped at shrines. "Ritual purity" and "a sense of awe and reverence before nature" are
two of the central aspects of Shinto. REISCHAUER, supra note 15, at 42. Shinto is unique to
Japan and under the earlier Japanese constitution of 1889 was considered the national religion of
Japan. SIK, supra note 18, at 178.
27. HANE, supra note 25, at 140.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 190; REISCHAUER, supra note 15, at 36.
30. HANE, supra note 25, at 140.
31. The period from 1603 to 1868 is known as the Tokugawa Era in Japanese history. The
Tokugawa Era is named after the Tokugawa family, who ruled as shogun or military leaders
during this period. In 1601, Tokugawa Ieyasu consolidated his power over the other warring
lords, establishing his capital in Tokyo. The Tokugawa Era is known as Japan's feudal period.
The period was characterized by a rigid social class system with samurai or warriors at the top,
followed by farmers, artisans, merchants, and the Eta or Burakumin. NISH, supra note 15, at 67;
FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 5, 11 (1987).
32. Id. at 79.
33. HANE, supra note 25, at 144-45. Burakumin could not even enter the home of a peasant,
wear geta (traditional Japanese sandals), or comb their hair in typical Japanese fashion. UPHAM,
supra note 31, at 79.
34. UPHAM, supra note 31, at 79.
35. The Meiji Emperor ruled Japan from 1868-1912, after the decline of the Tokugawa Era.
During this period (named after the Emperor Meiji), Japan made the rapid move from isolation
to industrialization and modernization. The first Japanese constitution, as well as Japanese laws
and views on issues such as nationality, were formed during this era. Id. at 14, 69.
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the Burakumin into society. Twenty-six thousand Japanese peasants
rioted in Okayama in May 1875. The peasants demanded a return to
the Tokugawa Era treatment of the Burakumin, complete with the
segregation and humiliation of the Burakumin. 36  Eighteen
Burakumin were killed, eleven seriously injured, and approximately
400 Burakumin homes were burnt to the ground during this demon-
stration by the peasants.3 7 In a later anti-Burakumin pogrom in June
1875, 100,000 Japanese peasants rioted in Fukuoka and burned ap-
proximately 2,200 Burakumin homes. 38 To fuel expansionist govern-
ment plans, the Meiji government promoted the view that the
Burakumin were descended from Korean slaves.39
Currently, although numbering close to 3 million, the Burakumin
are subject to discrimination of a most pervasive and pernicious na-
ture. Burakumin are denied opportunities to enter leading universities
and are not hired by many corporations. 4° Detective agencies main-
tain and compile books and computerized lists tracking Burakumin
families. This data is shared with and among Japanese corporations so
that they can continue their discrimination against the Burakumin. 41
Japanese parents keep their children from playing with Burakumin
children. Even inanimate objects, such as religious icons, are not
brought into Burakumin communities for fear of contamination.4 2
Faced with such widespread discrimination, many Burakumin
must take low-paying jobs.43 Burakumin are two times more likely
36. HANE, supra note 25, at 144.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Wagstyl, supra note 21, at 17. Like slaves in pre-Civil war America, the lives of
Burakumin were treated as less valuable than the lives of Japanese. A notable example comes
from a murder trial in the 1800s where a man who killed a Burakumin was not executed because
he had killed only one Burakumin and not seven. The nineteenth century Japanese court as-
serted that one "ordinary Japanese was worth seven Buraku." John Saar, Japan's Outcasts Fight
Back, WASH. POST, June 12, 1977, at B5.
40. Although universities in Japan are said to have an ethnically blind admissions policy,
fewer Burakumin attend higher educational institutions. See Wagstyl, supra note 21, at 17.
41. Clayton Jones, Japan's Invisible Minority Rejects Life on the Margins, CHRISTIAN SCL
MONITOR, Jan. 9, 1991, at 6, 7. It was not until the 1970s that the existence of these records was
discovered by the Burakumin. These lists identify Burakumin family names and districts. See
WILLIAM J. HOLSTEIN, THE JAPANESE POWER GAME 55 (1990). For a Burakumin to succeed
in Japan, he must disguise his identity, clear his tracks to his family, and sever all ties with the
Burakumin society. Id.
42. See Jones, supra note 41, at 6.
43. Burakumin are often employed in recycling and selling used tires and junk. HOLSTEIN,
supra note 41, at 55. Many, however, remain employed in the leather tanning industry which
first caused their degradation. In fact, the Japanese government often points to the "Burakumin
problem" when faced with demands from trading partners to open the shoe and tanned leather
markets to foreign importers. The Burakumin remain a facile scapegoat for the Japanese govern-
ment to this day. See EEC/Japan: No Movement on High Japanese Tariffs, European Report,
Oct. 17, 1990, § V., no. 1622, at 4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File; see also Ja-
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than other Japanese to be dependent on social security. 44 Faced with
such dismal prospects, many Burakumin commit suicide.45
Burakumin also often reside in slums of wooden shacks, sometimes
without electricity, on the outskirts of prosperous Japanese cities.46
For example, the beautiful, ancient, former capital city of Kyoto is
home to a Burakumin ghetto of substandard housing as well as impe-
rial palaces and shrines.47
There have been some efforts made to improve the situation of the
Burakumin. A Burakumin antidiscrimination organization, the
Burakumin Liberation League (BLL), was organized in 1922. The
Japanese government has made attempts to improve the situation of
the Burakumin. For example, in 1969 the Japanese government initi-
ated a series of steps known as dowa (assimilation). 4 Although dowa
projects improved housing opportunities for the Burakumin, dowa has
proven to be of limited success. Statistics show that Burakumin levels
of literacy, employment, health, and economic security remain below
those of the average Japanese. 49 Yet despite the persistence of sub-
standard conditions for the Burakumin, the Japanese government an-
nounced that in March 1992 the dowa plan will be terminated.50
Burakumin leaders assert that the dowa program should not only
be extended, but also expanded further. The BLL seeks enactment of
a new law that would criminalize discrimination against the
Burakumin. 51 BLL officials also support the institution of an antidis-
crimination program in Japanese schools. 52
pan's "Untouchables" Center of Trade Dispute with EC, Reuters Library Report, July 13, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
44. Wagstyl, supra note 18, at 17. Some early studies reveal that 60% of all unemployed
people in the Japan of the 1960s were Burakumin. JON HALLIDAY, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
JAPANESE CAPITALISM 231 (1975).
45. Saar, supra note 39, at B3. The despair caused by this cruel discrimination is evidenced
by the case of Michie Nakamura. Ms. Nakamura is a Burakumin woman who was jilted by her
lover of six years. The relationship was severed due to the pressure of her lover's family, who
were aghast at the idea of his marriage with a Burakumin. Upon being rejected by her lover, Ms.
Nakamura killed him. Id.
46. Wagstyl, supra note 21, at 17.
47. See HOLSTEIN, supra note 41, at 55. According to a 1963 Japanese Ministry of Welfare
report, although 20% of all Japanese families lived below the poverty line (then $0.45 per day),
the population density in Burakumin villages was ten times greater than that of other villages in
Japan and the per person income in Burakumin villages was a mere one-twentieth that of neigh-
boring villages. HALLIDAY, supra note 44, at 231.
48. Jones, supra note 41, at 7.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Dowa has cost the Japanese government more than $26 billion over the past 23 years. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 7. Like many minority groups, the Burakumin do not entirely agree on how best to
remedy the situation. While the BLL seeks a more activist campaign to eliminate discrimination,
some Burakumin are not comfortable with the attention that the BLL is bringing to the situation.
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The persistence and tolerance of discrimination by the Japanese
against other Japanese, like the Burakumin, shows that discriminatory
attitudes have not merely been imposed from theoutside, and suggests
a reason to be wary that such intolerant attitudes may be brought with
the Japanese to their investments in the United States.
2. Japanese Discrimination Against Koreans
Ethnic Koreans constitute a significant percentage of Japan's small
minority population. Japan-born Koreans are descendants of Koreans
brought to Japan in bondage during World War II. To this day, they
remain the victims of discrimination.5 3 Japan-born Koreans are
forced to register as foreigners, to carry alien identification cards, and
to be fingerprinted by the government. 54 Koreans in Japan are denied
employment by the civil services and many corporations. These Kore-
ans, most of whom have worked and paid taxes in Japan their entire
lives, were until recently denied benefits under the Japanese national
pension plan.5 5 Housing opportunities for Japan-born Koreans are
also restricted by many landlords in the already expensive Japanese
housing markets.56
Japan-born Koreans have attempted to deal with this discrimina-
tion through denial and assimilation. The majority of the 677,000
Koreans in Japan have been forced by societal pressure to use Japa-
nese names in their day-to-day lives, in a drastic denial of their Korean
heritage. Such attempts to quietly assimilate into Japan's closed soci-
ety usually fail. 57 Japanese employers and prospective in-laws support
a virtual industry of hundreds of investigators who check into the eth-
nic backgrounds of applicants and potential spouses to ascertain the
They support an optimistic plan of quiet and gradual assimilation into Japanese culture. The
problem with that strategy is that if the Burakumin do not call attention to their situation, it will
be difficult to establish evidence of their numbers and the discrimination against them. Id.
53. Many Japan-born Koreans are the descendants of Koreans pressed into service during
Japan's colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945. During World War II, Korean men were
brought to Japan as slave labor and Korean women were imprisoned in brothels for the Japanese
military. Robert Whymant, Courage of Korean Girl Who Peeled Off Japanese Disguise, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, May 24, 1990, at 12.
54. Id.
55. See Japan Lags on Foreigner's Rights, Attorneys Told, Kyodo News Service, Nov. 4, 1988,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
56. See Whymant, supra note 53, at 12.
57. In Japan, even wealthy Koreans are the targets of racism. One Korean businessman who
purchased a golf membership in an exclusive Japanese club was urged to join under a Japanese
name. After his Korean identity was discovered, the club pressured him to resign his member-
ship. Despite obtaining a refund from the club, the Korean businessman instituted an action
alleging discrimination, in order to publicize this injustice. The family now finds itself the target
of a harassment campaign. HOLSTEIN, supra note 41, at 51.
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existence of any Korean ancestry. 58 In fact, to gain Japanese citizen-
ship, Japan-born Koreans must formally surrender their Korean iden-
tity;59 although recently, on the urging of South Korean President
Roh Tae Woo, the Japanese government has promised to spare Ko-
rean residents the indignity of fingerprinting and to grant them perma-
nent residence in Japan.6°
3. Japanese Discrimination Against Other Asians
Other Asian minorities in Japan also suffer from widespread dis-
crimination. For example, Pakistani workers in Japan are the targets
of racism in many sectors of Japanese society. The ethnic and reli-
gious differences between the Pakistanis and the Japanese are at the
heart of the discrimination. The Japanese National Police Agency's
International Research and Training Institute for Investigation pub-
lished a 179-page report -cautioning Japanese police about special
problems when dealing with Pakistani suspects. The report, circulated
to regional police offices, noted that "[s]ince [Pakistanis] have a unique
body odor, the detention and interrogation rooms will stink."'6' Japa-
nese police were also cautioned that "[i]t is absolutely necessary to
wash your hands after questioning or detaining [Pakistanis] because
many of them suffer from contagious skin diseases. ' '62
After the report was disclosed by a Japanese newspaper, the Police
Agency apologized to the Pakistani Embassy in Tokyo, claiming that
the document's goal was to "'raise awareness' about people from an
unfamiliar culture. ' 63 Japanese police asserted that the regional of-
fices needed to learn more about Pakistan.
The police are not the only Japanese officials to make discrimina-
tory remarks about the Pakistanis. For example, the mayor of
Kawaguchi, a Japanese industrial city, reportedly announced that
"Japanese people could bump into Pakistanis at night because of their
dark skin." 64
58. Id.; Whymant, supra note 53, at 12.
59. This practice has been defeated in court by one Japan-born Korean. See Whymant, supra
note 53, at 12.
60. Id.
61. Karl Schoenberger, Issue of Japanese Racism Grows with Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
1, 1990, at AI, A20.
62. Id. at A20.
63. Id. Japanese Police officials acknowledged that the report "was badly worded." Id. Any
questions about the wording of the report, however, must be secondary to concerns with the
content of the document. The report condemned the religious tenets of the Pakistanis, claiming
that Pakistanis "lie in the name of Allah" and are quick to anger when unknowingly fed pork.
Id.
64. Id. Mayor Yoji Nagase maintains that his comments were not indicative of racial preju-
dice against Pakistanis. Id.
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Pakistanis are also subject to discrimination in hiring and often can
find work only in jobs with unsafe and unsanitary working conditions,
and without employer-provided health benefits. 65 Instead of taking
steps to ameliorate the situation, however, the Japanese government
has responded with a new immigration law requiring workers from
Pakistan and Bangladesh to have visas.66 The racist goals of the new
law are made abundantly clear by the statements of a senior Foreign
Ministry official; this official stated, "[i]f we let in Asian laborers, it
could destroy the homogeneity of Japanese society. ' '6
7
Change may be coming, however. In order to improve their situa-
tion, Asian workers have joined forces with Japanese social and polit-
ical activists to form the Cooperation of Asian Laborers for
Liberation.68
4. Japanese Anti-Semitism
Although there are only approximately 150 Jewish families in Ja-
pan, 69 the Japanese have been accused of anti-Semitism. 70 These alle-
gations stem from books like Masami Uno's If You Understand the
Jews, You Will Understand the World. This best seller has been as-
sailed by Jews as "a diatribe of antisemitism" which "praises Adolph
[sic] Hitler."'71 Uno asserts in his book that Jews are seeking to de-
stroy the Japanese economy as part of a global Zionist conspiracy of
world domination. 72
65. Pakistanis have been denied employment opportunities due to the mistaken beliefs of
some Japanese that "there are a lot of communicable diseases ... among Pakistanis." Id. See
also HOLSTEIN, supra note 41, at 53.
66. The new law also requires presentation of a visa before a worker may be employed and
establishes criminal penalties for employers who violate this law. Schoenberger, supra note 61, at
A20.
67. Irene Kunii, Racist Slur Rekindles Debate Over Japan's View of the World, Reuter Li-
brary Report, Sept. 29, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
68. HOLSTEIN, supra note 41, at 53. The Cooperation of Asian Laborers for Liberation com-
bats discrimination that workers face in housing and problems they have obtaining proper medi-
cal attention. Nobuki Omori, head of the Cooperation of Asian Laborers for Liberation, points
out that part of the problem with foreign workers in Japan is the lack of a Japanese commitment
to assimilate these workers into Japanese society. Id.
69. Willy M. Stern, David and Godzilla: Among the Antisemites in Japan, THE NEW REPUB-
LIC, Feb. 27, 1989, at 17.
70. Professor David G. Goodman of The University of Illinois links Japanese anti-Semitic
views with the negative portrayals of Jews by Christian missionaries visiting Japan in the 1870s.
Goodman also asserts that the first Shakespearean play translated into Japanese was The
Merchant of Venice, which has long been considered anti-Semitic. David G. Goodman, Reason
for Concern in Japanese Anti-Semitism (letter to the editor), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1987, at A26.
71. Meeting Studies Japanese Anti-Semitism, UPI, Apr. 10, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
72. Stem, supra note 69, at 17. Uno places notable "Jewish" families like the Rockefellers,
Morgans, DuPonts, and Mellons at the heart of the conspiracy. "Jewish" leader and former
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Other popular books in Japan assert that Jews have caused the
U.S.-Japan trade disputes, AIDS, and the Chernobyl disaster, and that
Jews run world finance.73 For example, a book entitled Find the Hyde
of Dr. Jekyll, by Takashi Hirose, asserts that the late Armand Ham-
mer and other prominent Jews were behind the Chernobyl disaster as
part of a financial conspiracy. 74
Evidence of anti-Semitic biases has also surfaced in the words of
Japanese leaders. Japanese Minister of Posts and Telecommunications
Masaaki Nakayama stated that "Jews own all the 'seven sisters.' They
control agriculture in America and the international precious metals
market. Both George Bush and Michael Dukakis are related to
Jews."' 75 A member of the Japanese Diet, Eisaburo Saito, has written
a book entitled The Secret of Jewish Power to Control the World.76
Interestingly enough, the Japanese largely do not feel that these
comments and publications are anti-Semitic. For example, the presi-
dent of McDonald's in Japan, Den Fujita, boasts that he is the "Jew of
Ginza." Mr. Fujita is also the author of Jewish Business Methods:
Controlling the Economy of the World. In this book, Fujita alleges
that the world economy is "being ravaged by a pack of Jews." Fujita
maintains, however, that his countrymen should strive to emulate
those business techniques he identifies as "Jewish." 77
Ryohei Murata, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, at-
tributes Japanese anti-Semitism to the Japanese people's "almost total
lack of knowledge" of Jewish religion or culture.7 8 The Japanese For-
Saudi Arabian Oil Minister, Sheik Yamani, has also been linked by Uno to the Zionist expansion-
ist plans. Id. at 17. Uno himself has been linked to the PLO. Id. at 18.
Professor Goodman believes that Uno's work is heavily steeped in The Protocols of the Elders
of Zion. This infamous work of anti-Semitism has been linked to the rise of Hitler in Germany
and the Holocaust. It was first translated into Japanese in 1924 and was published in Japan as
recently as 1987 by the Shin-Jinbutsu Oraisha publishing company. Goodman, supra note 70, at
A26.
73. Stem, supra note 69, at 17.
74. See Wiesenthal Center and Japanese Antisemitism, PR Newswire, June 16, 1988, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File. Passover, a book written by a Japanese woman
and assailed as anti-Semitic, was selected by a jury of Japanese novelists as the winner of the
prestigious 94th Akutagawa Prize for literature. Goodman, supra note 70, at A26.
75. Stern, supra note 69, at 17. Ironically, Minister Nakayama is Secretary General of the
Japan-Israel Parliamentary Friendship Association. He asserts that his comments are made to
"educate" his countrymen. Id.
76. Jews, Japan, Boycotts and Bigotry, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 29, 1987, at 13.
77. Stern, supra note 69, at 17.
78. Murata says Japanese 'Ashamed' of Kajiyama Remarks, Kyodo News Service, Oct. 30,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File. Ambassador Murata admitted that his
people "have no concept of what anti-Semitism is or of the circumstances of the creation of the
state of Israel." Id. While addressing the American Jewish Committee in Washington, D.C.,
Ambassador Murata stated that it was his "conviction that the Japanese and Jewish peoples
should deepen each other's understanding of differences and similarities to contribute to the spiri-
tual enrichment of the entire international community." Id.
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eign Ministry has prepared a fact sheet detailing "The American Jew-
ish Problem" to provide information to its citizens. 79
This apparent lack of knowledge gives no comfort to Jews, how-
ever, especially in light of Japanese corporations' secondary boycott of
Israel and tertiary boycott of firms that do business with Israel. 80 Un-
til very recently neither Toyota nor Nissan sold products to Israeli
firms. Toyota furthermore reportedly abandoned a joint venture with
Ford in 1981 due to the Arab League's boycott of Ford. Toyota's
decision was reputedly in response to boycott threats from Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.81 Finally, in the spring of 1991, Toyota an-
nounced that it would sell cars in Israel. 82
Similarly, after a visit to Israel by the Japanese Foreign Affairs
Minister, Takakazu Kuriyama, the Israeli Police inquired if NEC Cor-
poration, would sell it fingerprinting machines. NEC officials replied,
"We have a policy not to trade with Israel. ' ' 83 NEC joins Sansui Elec-
tric Company, C. Itoh & Company, Nippon Steel Corporation, Honda
Motor Company, 84 Sumitomo Corporation, Mazda Motor Corpora-
tion, Matsushita Electrical Industrial Company, Mitsui & Company,
Hitachi, Ltd., Toshiba Corporation, and Fuji Photo Film Company in
boycotting Israel. 85 Furthermore, the Japan External Trade Organiza-
tion (JETRO),86 which has offices in fifty-seven nations, does not have
an office in Israel.87 Despite Japan's large economic presence in the
Middle East, no Japanese Prime Minister had visited Israel until
79. Stern, supra note 69, at 18.
80. Japan is extremely dependent on imported oil from Arab States. The Arab oil embargo
of the early 1970s caused great economic distress in Japan, threatening both the operation of
many Japanese industries and the economic gains that Japan had made since the 1960s. REIS-
CHAUER, supra note 15, at 372. Fear of future oil embargoes is the most convincing explanation
for Japan's support of the Arab League boycott of Israel.
81. See Jews, Japan, Boycotts and Bigotry, supra note 76, at 13.
82. Doron P. Levin, Toyota to Sell Cars in Israel, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1991,
at D1. Toyota officials maintain that they previously did not sell in Israel because Toyota lacked
the resources to do so, and not because Toyota was complying with the Arab boycott. Id. The
Toyota cars to be sold in Israel will come initially from Japan. Id.
83. Willy M. Stem, Israeli Trade Ban Gets Airing But Little Action, JAPAN ECON. J., Jan. 2
and 9, 1988, at 14.
84. Honda's U.S.'subsidiary sells cars to Israel, taking advantage of the U.S.-Israel Free
Trade Agreement which lowers tariff barriers between the two countries. Levin, supra note 82,
at D5.
85. Stern, supra note 83, at 14.
86. JETRO is a Japanese government organization established in 1958 to facilitate and pro-
mote Japanese international trade. JETRO activities include "market research, data dissemina-
tion, export and import promotion, and overseas public relations work." Brief for the Japan
External Trade Organization at 2, Suinitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176
(1982) (No. 80-2070). JETRO offices are located worldwide. Id. at 2.
87. Stern, supra note 83, at 14.
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1988.88 In addition, the Japanese government denies landing rights to
El-Al, the national airline of Israel. 89
5. Japanese Discrimination Against Black and Hispanic Americans
Perhaps no minority group has been pilloried more by comments
by Japanese leaders than black Americans. Blacks were largely un-
known in Japan until World War II and the U.S. occupation of Japan.
In the postwar era, the United States gave Japan a new constitution
and the means to rebuild. However, the United States also gave Japan
a subtle and pernicious export: racism towards blacks. The Japanese
observed segregated facilities for black American G.I.s.90 U.S. films
and television programs spread other stereotypes of blacks.9'
Blacks in Japan do not face the same type of racism that confronts
them in many places in the United States. In Japan, however, the
prejudice against blacks consists of a barrage of suspicion and ridicule.
Blacks must deal with discrimination in housing and employment.92
They are also the targets of an insensitive and racist corporate commu-
nity. For example, until recently, Japanese companies sold "Darkie"
toothpaste in Tokyo, in a tube adorned with the smiling image of a
black minstrel. 93
Indeed, the Sambo stereotype, long abandoned in America, is quite
popular with Japanese companies and consumers alike. Sanrio Corpo-
ration, a Japanese manufacturer of gifts and toys, caused a whirlwind
of resentment by blacks with its popular beach wear featuring
Sambo. 94 Sanrio racked up over $11 million in sales from these prod-
ucts in 1987. 91 Sanrio pulled the Sambo products from its line in re-
sponse to criticism from blacks in America and Japan. Kazuo
88. Prime Minister Sosuke Uno's decision to visit Israel was met with intensive lobbying by
Arab ambassadors in Tokyo. Uno announced that his planned visit did not indicate a shift in
"Japan's pro-Arab Middle East Policy." Stern, supra note 83, at 18. However, in the United
States, representatives of the Uno administration characterized this visit as a "milestone in Ja-
pan-Jewish relations." Id.
89. See Jews, Japan, Boycotts and Bigotry, supra note 76, at 13.
90. John Greenwald, Prejudice and Black Sambo, TIME, Aug. 15, 1988, at 25.
91. Id.
92. See Larry Whiteside, The Agony of Being Black in Japan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6,1991,
at A25; see also Kate Elwood, Not All Foreigners are Created Equal, JAPAN ECON. J., Nov. 3,
1990, at 1.
93. See Clarence Page, Japan's No Slouch at Slurs, Either, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 1988, § 4, at 3.
94. Greenwald, supra note 90, at 25. Sanrio Corporation's Sambo product line featured
Sambo and his sister Hanna - black dolls with exaggerated lips. Id. The Sambo sales campaign
included the following racist message: "When I'm hungry there's no stoppin' me. I'll be up a
palm tree pickin' coconuts before you can count to three (An' I can count way past three tool)."
See Dorothy Gilliam, Japan: Ignorance or Racism?, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1988, at D3.
95. Greenwald, supra note 90, at 25. This established that while crime may not pay, racism
does - and quite handsomely.
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Tomatsu, a spokesman for Sanrio, stated, "We were making a summer
item, and we designed it to be kawaii [cute]. We deeply regret that we
lacked consideration in regard to minorities in the United States."'96
After withdrawing the offensive items from its 3,000 stores, Sanrio
donated $600,000 worth of toys and other merchandise to children in
the United States. 97
The use of Sambo is not limited to Sanrio Corporation. Yamato
Mannequin Company manufactured black mannequins with distorted
Sambo-like features. In response to a study by Yamato which deter-
mined that the mannequins represented "new sexiness, kawaii [cute-
ness] and fresh energy," these mannequins were placed in dancing
poses.98 Blacks in Tokyo are also insulted by the "Chibi Kuro
Sambo" (Little Black Sambo) Inn. The restaurant features waitresses
with dreadlocked hair dressed in red gingham smocks serving from a
menu including "little black fried chicken" and "little black potatoes."
The owner, like Sanrio and Yamato Mannequin, relies on claims of
kawaii (cuteness) as a defense of her blatant insensitivity.99
The Sambo stereotype is not restricted to Japanese advertising and
products. Singer Lionel Richie, during an appearance on a Japanese
TV show, stormed off the set after learning that his Japanese backup
singers were performing in minstrel black-face.1°°
Another example of racist attitudes comes from the pages of New
York Now, a Japanese magazine published for Japanese visitors to
New York. A map of the city enclosed in the magazine uses an illus-
tration of a black woman wearing a bandanna to denote Harlem.' 0 '
Harlem Assemblywoman Geraldine Daniels assailed the map, stating,
"[t]his mammy image of Harlem citizens is despicable and offensive,"
while questioning whether the blatant insults were a result of igno-
96. Greenwald, supra note 90, at 25.
97. David Freed, Making Amends Japanese Firm Hands Out Toys to Apologize for Racial
Gaffe, L.A. TiMES, Dec. 23, 1988, § II, at 3. Sanrio revealed its plan to establish a U.S.-Japan
children's exchange program and to publish a monthly magazine featuring characters of different
races. Sanrio Executive Vice President Kurt Yonezawa stated that they "were ignorant that
people would be offended [by the Sambo products]." Id.
98. Greenwald, supra note 90, at 25. Over 100 of these mannequins were on display in Ja-
pan, especially in the Harajuku shopping district of Tokyo. Id. See also Page, supra note 93, §
4, at 3.
99. See Schoenberger, supra note 61, at A22. The owner of the establishment declines to
change the name of the eatery. Sachiko Sasaki defends her action and states, "Itihis had nothing
to do with racial prejudice or how I feel about black people. I've always thought Little Black
Sambo was cute." Id.
100. See James B. Treece, Nakasone's Ugly Remark Says a Lot About Today's Japan, Bus.
WK., Oct. 13, 1986, at 66.
101. Japanese Magazine Blasted for Using 'Mammy Image, UPI, Aug. 15, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Harlem is a somewhat popular tourist attraction for Japanese
visitors to New York. Id.
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rance or arrogance.10 2
In addition, similar to the ways that Jews are vilified in Japanese
popular literature, Japanese authors dehumanize and stereotype
blacks. For example, Eimi Yamada's novel Bedroom Eyes, winner of
the Bungei Prize for new Japanese writers in 1985 and the 1987 Naoki
Prize for literature in Japan, features a Japanese protagonist who de-
scribes her black lover as "a dirty thing" with "close to a rotten smell"
who gives her "a feeling of superiority."' 10 3 Negative images of blacks
are also supported in Japanese business novels. In many of these
novels, blacks are portrayed as "streetwise, rioting, stealing or
drugged." 04
Recently, an increasing number of interracial relationships have
upset some Japanese leaders to the point that they are certain that "the
sun 'will surely set' on Japan when these people become the mothers of
the next generation of Japanese."' 10 5
Japanese racism towards blacks also may be evidenced by the
scathing comments of several prominent Japanese political figures.
For example, in 1986 then-Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone con-
trasted Japanese intellectual achievement with the United States and
noted, "Japan is now a highly educated and fairly intelligent society.
Much more so than America, on the average. In America, there are
quite a few black people, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans. On the aver-
age, it is still very low." 1°6
Similarly, Michio Watanabe, a former Finance and Trade Minister
and then-Chairman of the Policy Research Council of the Liberal
Democratic Party of Japan, felt compelled to insult black Americans
when contrasting U.S. society with Japanese society. Watanabe criti-
cized U.S. savings and consumption practices and blamed rising
102. Id.
103. Kate Elwood, Sexual Stereotypes Affect Racial Attitudes, JAPAN ECON. J., Nov. 3, 1990,
at 10. "Every night on base you'll see young women waiting to pick up a black man," states one
wife of a U.S. serviceman. Id. In this article, a Japanese woman reveals that she views black
men as "a straight tool (to relaxation)" and "pure amusement." Id. (parentheses in original).
104. Robert E. Cole & Donald R. Deskins, Jr., Racial Factors in Site Location and Employ-
ment Patterns of Japanese Auto Firms in America, 31 CAL. MGMT. REV. 9, 18 (1988).
105. Elwood, supra note 103, at 10. Japanese women engaging in relationships with black
men have been compared to prostitutes by national political leaders and have been denounced for
their licentious ways. Id.
106. Mary Thornton, Nakasone Making Amends to Blacks, WASH. POST, May 3, 1987, at
A23. Nakasone followed this remark with a slur on people of interracial heritage. Nakasone
stated, "People of unclear nationality like omajiri (mixture) cannot be respected." Nakasone
Might Have Slurred Mixed Blood People, Kyodo News Service, Dec. 26, 1986, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File. Nakasone later informed the press that his comments "did
not imply racial discrimination against people of mixed blood." Id.
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household debt problems on black Americans. Watanabe commented
that
[tihey use credit cards a lot. They have no savings, so they go bankrupt.
If Japanese become bankrupt, they think it serious enough to escape into
the night or commit family suicide. But among those guys over there are
so many blacks and so on, who would think nonchalantly: "We're bank-
rupt, but from tomorrow on we don't have to pay anything back. We
just can't use credit cards any more." 10 7
Watanabe apologized and retracted his earlier words, stating, "I made
misleading and inadvertent remarks, though in no sense did I ever im-
ply any racial discrimination."10 8 Mr. Watanabe's comments were
condemned as inaccurate and illogical in an editorial by the Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, a leading Japanese newspaper. 109
Most recently, the Japanese Minister of Justice, Seiroku Kajiyama,
stated that foreign Asian prostitutes in Japan threaten the community
in the same way that "[b]ad money drives out good money, just like in
America where the blacks came in and drove out the whites."110
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu quickly apologized for his cabinet min-
ister's remark, stating, "It was gravely inappropriate and I regret that
such a statement was ever made." 11
Minister of Justice Kajiyama, however, initially attempted to parry
criticism of his comments: "I intended to say that we must take meas-
ures to solve this problem. I did not mean to talk about racial is-
sues."' 12 Later, Kajiyama's clarification became an apology. While
admitting that his remarks may have been "inappropriate and wrong,"
he stated that they were "not at all related to racial discrimination."
Kajiyama opined that "[iun Japan, there is no discrimination against
any races." He blamed any apparent insensitivity on the fact that Ja-
pan "may not have a rich sensitivity toward racial questions" due to a
lack of "experience in communicating and intermingling with different
nationalities." 1 3
The scathing remarks of Nakasone, Watanabe, and Kajiyama did
not go unnoticed by Americans. Nakasone's disparaging remarks
107. Susan Chira, Tokyo Again Astir over Racial Slight, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1988, at AI0.
108. Id.
109. Id. The editorial noted that "[m]aking a general statement that all black people are
nonchalant about their life plans is very crude. [Watanabe] should know from Prime Minister
Nakasone's intellectual level incident that the sensitivity toward racial issues in the United States
is very keen." Id.
110. Kunii, supra note 67.
111. Id.
112. Dewayne Wickham, Another Voice: Japan Exports Racism, Gannett News Service,
Sept. 24, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
113. David E. Sanger, Japanese Offers Apology For Slur, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 18, 1990, at A7.
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sparked a boycott of Japanese goods by the League of United Latin
American Citizens (LULAC). 114 Jesse Jackson threatened a boycott
of Japanese products by black Americans in response to Nakasone's
comments and also expressed his concerns directly to Nakasone.' 15 In
April 1987 a delegation from the Congressional Black Caucus visited
Japan and met with Nakasone, admonishing him for his comments
and reminding Nakasone of the purchasing power of black Ameri-
cans. 1 6 Nakasone visited the United States in May of 1987 and met
with the Congressional Black Caucus." 7
The Hispanic Caucus visited Japan in August of 1987 and also met
with Nakasone. Nakasone apologized to the Hispanic community for
his comments, stating that he recognized the importance of the His-
panic community in America and stressing that his remarks were mis-
understood.'8 Representative Esteban Torres, the Hispanic Caucus
delegation head, expressed his opinion that "Hispanic-Americans are
willing to put aside their disappointment over the Japanese Prime
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's derogatory remarks on their education
level and take this opportunity as a time for a new opening."' ' 19
Watanabe's slurs were similarly criticized by other U.S. political
leaders. A diverse, bipartisan group made up of twenty members of
Congress delivered a response to Watanabe's comments and informed
Nobuo Matsunaga, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States,
that they were "deeply offended by the racist depiction of blacks."'' 20
114. Boycott, UPI, Dec. 12, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. LULAC
instituted the boycott to force Nakasone to retract his statements. Id.
115. John Burgess, Jackson Urges Japan to Better Minority Ties, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1986,
at A30. While in Japan, Jackson also sought to improve Japanese treatment of the Ainu,
Burakumin, and Koreans. In addition, he cautioned the Japanese on their growing economic
presence in South Africa. Id.
116. See Nakasone Hopes for Better Relations with U.S. Blacks, Kyodo News Service, Apr.
13, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File. Nakasone told the Congressional Black
Caucus delegation that Japanese firms were trying to increase communications with U.S. minori-
ties and requested that the Caucus communicate more frequently with the Japanese embassy in
the United States. Id.
117. Thornton, supra note 106, at A23. According to the late Rep. Mickey Leland (D-Tex.),
"[o]bviously the Prime Minister has been made very sensitive about the concerns of ethnic mi-
norities in this country." Id. The Nakasone meeting with the Caucus was part of two days of
meetings with President Reagan to discuss lowering tariffs on Japanese goods. Id.
118. Nakasone Apologizes to Hispanic-Americans for Racial Slight, Reuters LibraryReport,
Aug. 28, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File. A retraction of the Nakasone
comment was sought by Hispanic leaders, not an apology. The unsolicited apology was not
accepted because, according to G. Ruben Jauregui, president of the LATIN Business Associa-
tion, "(w]e thought it should be left untouched." Id.
119. US. Hispanic Representative Torres Visiting Japan, Kyodo News Service, Aug. 26,
1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File. The Hispanic Caucus meetings in Japan
called for an increase in Japanese sensitivity to and communication with the Hispanic commu-
nity. Id.
120. Gilliam, supra note 94, at D3.
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Members of the Congressional Black Caucus joined forces with two
Japanese-American members of Congress to lambast the blatant insen-
sitivity of Watanabe's comments. Representative Robert Matsui (D-
Cal.) explained,
This is not an issue that only the black community is concerned about.
This is an issue that all Americans must and have to be concerned about
when you have a great power such as the nation of Japan showing the
kind of insensitivity that we've seen over the last few years. 121
Kajiyama's comments drew the greatest amount of attention from
Americans and U.S. political leaders. The Congressional Black Cau-
cus sought the resignation of Minister Kajiyamal 22 and the U.S.
House Foreign Affairs Committee condemned Kajiyama's state-
ment. 123 The NAACP instituted an "informational picket line" at the
Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C.' 24
With Kajiyama's comments as the focal point of their criticism of
Japanese racism, twenty-three members of Congress tackled the com-
ments of Nakasone, Watanabe, and Kajiyama in a concurrent resolu-
tion expressing outrage "regarding racially offensive remarks by
officials of the Japanese Government."' 25 This resolution notes that
the "continuing reprehensible comments by officials of the Japanese
Government are clear evidence of the deep, pervasive and fundamental
racism endemic in that country's government." 126 The resolution cites
the contributions of the United States and of black Americans to Ja-
pan's postwar development and the role of black troops in the Persian
Gulf in protecting interests vital to Japan as well as the United
States. 127 The resolution acknowledges the past apologies of Kaifu
and Kajiyama but nonetheless observes that "despite these words of
121. Robert Shepard, Blacks Angry over Japanese Practices, UPI, Aug. 3, 1988, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Representative Norman Mineta (D-Cal.) stated, "IThe racism
now on display in Japan angers me." Id. Mineta said, "What angers me more is the reluctance
to learn from their own mistakes ... a reluctance in Japan to accept the fact that the products
we're citing here today and the underlying attitudes which they embody are racist and offensive."
Id. Representative Mineta's statement on Watanabe's comments were made in tandem with the
Sanrio Corporation's Sambo line controversy.
122. Michael Berger, Dellums Calls for Resignation of Japan Official for Racial Slur, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 25, 1990, at A18.
123. Les Payne, With Japan, Stereotypes Cut Two Ways, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWSDY File. Representative Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) led the at-
tack on Kajiyama, decrying that racist comments are "a national sport of Japan." Id.
124. Robert C. Toth, Blacks Pressing Japanese to Halt Slurs, Prejudice, L.A. TiMES, Dec. 13,
1990, at A5. After ending the "informational picketing," the NAACP suspended plans for a
mass demonstration against Japan. However, Benjamin L. Hooks, Executive Director of the
NAACP, stated, "This is far from being a closed issue." Id.
125. H.R. Con. Res. 72, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id. at 2-3.
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apology, the United States Congress has witnessed little evidence on
the part of the Japanese Government to recognize the gravity of the
situation and to initiate actions to combat the insensitive stereotyping
of African Americans." 128
After determining that "the vitality of our economic relationship
necessarily depends upon a basis of mutual respect which cannot be
fostered in a climate of racism and antagonism," the resolution con-
cludes as follows:
[I]t is the sense of Congress that (1) the President should request an
official apology to all Americans, in particular African Americans, from
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, for the remarks of Justice Minister
Seiroku Kajiyama, (2) immediate and direct action be taken by Prime
Minister Toshiki Kaifu and his administration to combat the racist atti-
tudes which prevail among Japanese Government and corporate officials
and to engage in an aggressive educational initiative to expose and en-
hance the understanding of the Japanese people regarding the positive
elements of multiethnic and multiracial societies, and (3) as one of the
world's leading democracies, the Government of Japan should demand
of its officials the highest level of respect for the diverse peoples of the
world. 129
Minister of Justice Megumu Sato succeeded Kajiyama in Decem-
ber of 1990 and promptly announced a campaign to improve sensitiv-
ity to minorities and human rights.130 Sato pledged to hold a series of
symposia, lectures, and advertisements to promote understanding of
minority concerns. Minister Sato also promised to support the propo-
sal of legislation that will protect Korean and Taiwanese residents
from deportation and help them to establish permanent residency in
Japan, and also to cease the fingerprinting of Japan-born Koreans.' 3 '
B. Sexism in Japan
Although Japan has at various times in its history been led by wo-
men, 32 at present, women are the victims of discrimination in the cor-
porate culture of Japan. Even women who have degrees from
prestigious universities are often shut out of managerial positions and
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id. at 3-4.
130. New Justice Minister Pledges Enlightenment Drive on Minorities, Kyodo News Service,
Dec. 29, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
131. Id.
132. Notable Japanese women historical leaders include the Empress Jingo (200-69 A.D.),
Empress Suiko (592-628 A.D.), Empress Jito (687-97 A.D.), Empress Gemmyo (707-15 A.D.),
and Empress Shokutu (764-70 A.D.), who also ruled as Empress Koken (749-58 A.D.). These
women are credited with the spread of Buddhism, establishing the first legal code (the Taiho
Code of 701), and leading troops into Korea. JANE CONDON, A HALF STEP BEHIND: JAPANESE
WOMEN OF THE 'SOs, at 2-3 (1985).
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relegated to typing and serving tea. 133
This change in the role of women is due in part to the rise of neo-
Confucian thought through the years. During the Tokugawa Era, 134
Confucian writings placed women in roles subservient to men and
boys. The book, Onna Daigaku (Great Learning for Women), details
the lowly position of women in the Tokugawa Era, specifying a wo-
man's chores and duties. 135
During the Tokugawa Era, infanticide of female babies was com-
monplace, demonstrating the low value Japanese society placed on fe-
male life. 136 Even after the Meiji Restoration, 137 women workers were
often oppressed, and typically sold to "labour-bosses" by male family
members.138 Although the Japanese government prohibited the selling
of women and girls in 1872, brokers continued to purchase women to
be indentured servants, prostitutes, and geishas well into the twentieth
century. 139 The few fortunate women who were able to obtain educa-
tions typically went unrewarded in Japanese society. 140
Although forced labor and infanticide have ceased in Japan, the
negative view of women has not changed. One example is a comment
by then-Director General of the Cultural Affairs Bureau, Miura
Shumon. Mr. Shumon noted in an article that the rape of "modern
young women" who have declining morality is "not so bad."'14'
Given this perception of a woman's role in society, it is not surpris-
ing that Japanese women face discrimination in employment. Women
applicants at one large Japanese employer are evaluated according to
blatantly biased hiring standards. The secret hiring guidelines for the
Japanese bookstore chain Kinokuniya Shoten designated the following
women unsuitable for employment: "divorcees, women who belong to
133. Id. at 183, 202. See also John E. Rehfeld, What Working for a Japanese Company
Taught Me, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1990, 167, 173; Michael Korver, Office is a Microcosm
of Society, JAPAN ECON. J., May 3, 1986, at 40.
134. See supra note 31.
135. See JAPAN: THE SHAPING OF DAIMYO CULTURE 1185-1868, at 43-44 (Yoshiaki
Shimizu ed., 1988). According to the Onna Daigaku, a woman "must sew her father-in-law's
and mother-in-law's garments and make ready their food. Ever attentive to the requirements of
her husband, she must fold his clothes and dust his rug, rear his children, wash what is dirty, be
constantly in the midst of her household, and never go abroad but of necessity .... Id. at 44.
136. CONDON, supra note 132, at 3.
137. See supra note 35.
138. HALLIDAY, supra note 44, at 54, 63.
139. HANE, supra note 25, at 208, 210-11. Brokers openly advertised their willingness to
purchase women and girls. During the famine of 1934, thousands of women were sold into
service as prostitutes, geishas, and sake-waitresses who slept with customers. Id.
140. CAROL GLUCK, JAPAN'S MODERN MYTHS 168 (1985). Educated women in the late
Meiji Era were not considered good marriage candidates and were viewed as "less prepared for
their role as 'good wife, wise mother,'" and as "females not suited to the countryside." Id.
141. KARL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 173 (1989).
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political or religious groups, women who respect passionate artists
such as Vincent Van Gogh . . . , women living in rented rooms and
daughters of professors or wives of teachers."' 42
Japanese women are not able to use their ability to the utmost in
the workplace. Female college graduates are often limited to employ-
ment as "office ladies" or "OLs." Despite their educational accom-
plishments, these "flowers of the office" greet visitors, tidy desks, and
perform tasks that do not require any responsibility. As well, these
"office ladies" are typically shunned by men. 43 Prestigious firms like
Nomura Securities select office ladies on the basis of their appearance
in addition to their professional ability. 144 Nomura office ladies are
drilled by former Japan Air Lines stewardesses in bowing, walking,
smiling, telephone etiquette, tea service, and sitting.' 45 According to
an internal company training memorandum, Nomura office ladies are
"taught to serve men" and, in a manner similar to the Burakumin of
old, may not even drink tea in the presence of Japanese men. Instead,
Nomura women workers "must drink [their tea] in the washroom, not
in public."' 146
Women at every level of professional life are subj~ct to employ-
ment discrimination in Japan. An example of this occurred in May
1985, when then-Deputy Foreign Minister Mayumi Moriyama was
barred because of her sex from playing in a semiannual tournament
between the Foreign Ministry and the Tokyo Ambassadors at the
prestigious Koganei Country Club. 14  Although Foreign Minister
Shintaro Abe withdrew from the tournament because his deputy was
snubbed, he permitted the tournament to continue due to "its friendly
nature."' 4 18 Ms. Moriyama angrily stated, "In Japan, golf is often con-
142. Exposure of an In-house Document From a Leading Japanese Bookstore Has Drawn
Attention to Japanese Management's New Secret Weapon: Women, Kyodo News Service, Mar.
11, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File. The secret document also prohibits the
hiring of "ugly women," "short women-those less than 140 centimeters," and "women with
spectacles." Id. The document was revealed by a Japanese union group. Approximately 60%
of the Kinokuniya Shoten labor force is women. Id.
143. For a detailed discussion of the role of "office ladies," see JON WORONOFF, JAPAN'S
WASTED WORKERS 125-28 (1985).
144. See DANIEL BURSTEIN, YENI: JAPAN'S NEW FINANCIAL EMPIRE AND ITS THREAT
TO AMERICA 173 (1988). According to Burstein, the Nomura Securities personnel office, sensi-
tive to the long hours its male employees must work, hires attractive women as "office ladies" to
provide male workers with prospective spouses and dates. Id. at 173-74. See also ALBERT J.
ALLETZHAUSER, THE HOUSE OF NOMURA 188 (1990).
145. ALLETZHAUSER, supra note 144, at 190.
146. Id.
147. Tokyo Golfclub Slams Door on Top Woman Politician, Kyodo News Service, May 29,
1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
148. Id. Officials of the Koganei Country Club offered no apologies and claimed that they
would similarly bar Queen Elizabeth or Margaret Thatcher from playing on weekends (weekdays
are the only days women may play at the club, which has no women members). Id.
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nected with work. As a career woman, I can't overlook this
discrimination." 149
The Moriyama incident occurred one month after Japan's Equal
Employment Opportunity Law went into effect. Japan ratified the
U.N. Convention on nondiscrimination against women on June 26,
1985, five years after the Japanese government signed the conven-
tion.'50 The Japanese Equal Employment Opportunity Law "re-
quests" that Japanese firms make efforts "to provide women with
equal opportunities in hiring, promotion, training, fringe benefits, re-
tirement and termination."''1 The new law states that the Japanese
government should "endeavor" to assist the return to the workplace of
women who left to raise families.15 2
Perhaps the most significant development for employed Japanese
women is the newly revised Labor Standards Law. Women employed
as supervisors or managers or in skilled positions will now be permit-
ted to work overtime and on holidays. 153 Japanese women may now
legally work underground and in dangerous or harmful jobs, as long as
they are not pregnant or nursing. 154 The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Law also extends maternity leave for women workers to eight
weeks, and permits women to bring actions in district court for viola-
tions of these provisions. 155
Notwithstanding these new laws, Japanese women substantially
trail their male counterparts in educational and employment opportu-
nities. As of 1988, the percentage of Japanese women attending four
year colleges was 14.4%. This is less than half of the percentage of
Japanese men in four year colleges, which was 35.5%.156 Women
149. Id.
150. Japan Hands UN. Chief Anti-Discrimination Documents, Kyodo News Service, June 26,
1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File. Japan became the 71st country to ratify
the convention. Id.
151. Susan Frankel, Takes Effect April 1: New Law Attempts to Increase Opportunities for
Working Women, JAPAN ECON. J., Apr. 5, 1986, at 1, 16.
152. Id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Law is the result of compromise between con-
servatives and the Japan Socialist Party. As a mark of this uneasy truce, the law fails to mandate
actions to end discrimination and merely encourages employers to take various steps. Unlike the
counterpart U.S. law, there are no sanctions for companies that violate the Japanese law. Id.
However, Moriko Yamamoto of the Women's Bureau of the Ministry of Labor stated that




156. STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY PAPERS ENTITLED
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC CHALLENGE 261 (Comm. Print 1990). These numbers, albeit still low, rep-
resent a marked improvement according to recent studies. In 1985 it was reported that only
2.8% of Japanese women had graduated from four-year colleges. The percentage of men at this




remain underrepresented in Japanese management and comprise only
6.6% of all Japanese managers.1 57 As a response to the new laws,
many Japanese firms may adopt a two-tiered employment system for
college graduates. There is concern, however, that the new two-tiered
systems will merely result in men entering the managerial track, with
opportunities for training and promotion, and women entering a cleri-
cal track, with little or no opportunity for training or promotion.1 58
It is questionable whether Japanese leaders are truly committed to
equality for women. For example, in a speech given on February 9,
1988, then-Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita recommended that the
social status of women be improved. During a question-and-answer
period after this speech, Takeshita questioned the likelihood of his
party running women candidates in the next election because, he
maintained, "physical strength is required by members of the House of
Representatives."' 59
There are signs of improvement, however. In July 1990 the Tokyo
District Court awarded 96 million yen to a class of eighteen women in
a landmark sex discrimination case.16° This litigation took ten years
to wind through the Japanese courts, but the court finally held that the
female employees of the Social Welfare Medical Treatment Compen-
sation Fund had been unlawfully denied promotion in violation of Ar-
ticle 14 of the Japanese Constitution.' 6' The three-judge panel also
held that the employer's actions violated the Labor Standards Law,
which bars employers from gender-based salary discrimination. Un-
fortunately, the court's decision failed to grant the plaintiffs' demands
for promotion and lost compensation in the amount of 110 million
yen. 162
On the same day the decision was announced, forty women mem-
bers of the Japanese Diet-all of whom were members of the opposi-
tion party to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party-petitioned the
government to create a Women Affairs Department at the Cabinet
level. 163  The petition followed the appointment of Sakutaro
157. Id. This number represents less than 1% of the women in the Japanese workforce. Id.
158. Id. at 266.
159. Takeshita Calls for Improvement in Women's Status, Kyodo News Service, Feb. 9, 1988,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
160. Court Issues Landmark Ruling Against Sex Discrimination, Kyodo News Service, July
4, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
161. Id.
162. Id. Approximately half of the Fund's 6,000 employees are women, and it is estimated
that 290 women were unfairly denied promotion by the Fund. Id.
163. Dailies Hail Antidiscrimination Decision, Kyodo News Service, July 6, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File.
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Takahashi, a man, as head of the Women's Bureau. 164
Thus, evidence of discrimination against racial and ethnic minori-
ties in Japan, such as the Ainu, the Burakumin, the Koreans, the
Pakistanis, Jews, and black Americans, including the popular press's
image of such minorities, and the lack of opportunities for women and
the poor treatment of women, indicates that racist and sexist attitudes
are widely accepted in Japan and may be brought with the Japanese to
their investments in the United States.
II. DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES BY JAPANESE FIRMS
A. Racism
Despite the high visibility of its investments, Japan has only re-
cently become one of the world's leaders in foreign direct invest-
ment. 163 When Japanese firms make direct investments in the United
States, they bring with them capital, technology, and Japanese busi-
ness practices.1 66 Given the level, nature, and amount of discrimina-
tion present in Japan, it seems likely that Japanese firms would export
sexist and racist attitudes and policies when they invest in the United
States.
1. Japanese Discriminatory Site Selection and Hiring Practices
A study by the Southern Growth Policies Board chronicles the
growth of Japanese investment in the southern United States and re-
ports a nineteen percent annual growth rate in Japanese-created em-
ployment opportunities for the period 1977 to 1988.167 While the
southern United States is known to have lower production costs than
other parts of the country and to have a large black population, the
author of the study, Douglas Woodward of the University of South
Carolina, concludes that Japanese site selection in the South is based
on factors other than production costs. Woodward maintains that
Japanese racism deters them from building plants near areas with
164. Id. The Yomiuri Shimbun, one of Japan's major daily newspapers, hailed the appoint-
ment, stating that "the nomination of a man [to the Women's Bureau post] indicates the minis-
try's goal of strengthening the administration for women by involving more men in it." Id.
165. Daniel I. Okimoto, Outsider Trading: Coping with Japanese Industrial Organization, in
THE TRADE CRISIS: How WILL JAPAN RESPOND? 85, 103 (Kenneth B. Pyle ed., 1987). Japan
is the world's third leading foreign investor, surpassed only by the United States and the United
Kingdom. Id. The United States is the leading site of Japanese foreign investment. Id.
166. William J. Holstein et al., Mighty Mitsubishi is on the Move, Bus. WK., Sept. 24, 1990,
at 98. This article details the growing influence in the United States of several Japanese keiretsu,
which are closely knit conglomerates or groups of companies, focusing on the Mitsubishi
keiretsu.
167. Moonlight and Bonsais, ECONOMIST, July 7, 1990, at 30.
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large black populations. 168
Similarly, a study of Japanese auto plants in the United States
reveals that Japanese firms build plants away from areas that have
substantial black populations.' 69 Robert E. Cole and Donald R. Des-
kins, in a study on black hiring at four large Japanese auto plants in
the United States, identify "a consistent pattern" of Japanese plants
being constructed at least thirty miles from the nearest black popula-
tion center.' 70
According to the Cole and Deskins study, although blacks account
for 10.5% of the population in the hiring area of the Honda plant in
Marysville, Ohio, only 2.8% of that plant's workers are black.' 7' The
Nissan plant in Smyrna, Tennessee has a workforce that is 14% black
while the area's population is 19.3% black. Similarly, the Mazda fa-
cility in Flat Rock, Michigan is located in an area that has a black
population of 29%, yet the firm's labor force is only 14.1% black.
172
Only a General Motors-Toyota joint venture (NUMMI) in Fremont,
California earned high marks for minority hiring, with a work force
that is 23% black and 28% Hispanic. 73 According to the Cole-Des-
kins study, the NUMMI facility "has achieved an enviable reputation
for quality and productivity."1 74
The Japanese pattern of choosing plant locations to avoid signifi-
cant minority populations has also been described by Dennis Des
Rosiers, a Canadian auto industry consultant who has assisted Japa-
nese auto manufacturers in site selection. According to Des Rosiers,
[the Japanese] ask for profiles of [the] community by ethnic background,
by religious background, [and] by professional makeup .... There's
aspects (sic) that they like. They like a high German content. Germans
have a good work ethic-well-trained, easy to train, they accept things
168. Id.
169. See John Holusha, Japanese Faulted Over Black Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1988, at
A28; see also Cole & Deskins, supra note 104, at 9.
170. Holusha, supra note 169, at A28. A spokesman for the Japanese manufacturers chal-
lenged the study, claiming that the decisions were made because "land was available, there was
good road and rail transportation, it was near the supplier base and there was an available
workforce." Id.
171. Cole & Deskins, supra note 104, at 15. Such a hiring record constitutes a prima facie
case of discrimination under Title VII. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-40 (1977); Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
(1977); see also Leland Ware, A Remedy for the "Extreme Case": The Status of Affirmative
Action after Croson, 55 Mo. L. REV. 631, 695-97 (1990).
172. Holusha, supra note 169, at A28.
173. Cole & Deskins, supra note 104, at 14. The authors of the study, while applauding the
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.... [The Japanese] probably don't like other types of profiles. 175
During their study, Cole and Deskins were told by one official of a
Midwestern state, who had wooed Japanese investment to his state,
that "many Japanese companies at the time specifically asked to stay
away from areas with high minority populations."'' 7
6
A Nomura Securities brochure touting Oregon as a site for Japa-
nese investment because the state has a low minority population is
another example of blatant Japanese racism in site selection.177 Cali-
fornia is similarly recommended by JETRO as a site for investment
because the state has large numbers of Asians, promising "high quality
employees." 78
Japanese firms have frequently been the target of employment dis-
crimination actions. Honda paid approximately $6 million in a 1988
settlement of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) investigation of racial and sexual discrimination occurring be-
tween 1983 and 1986 at the Marysville, Ohio facility. 179 In addition to
the cash settlement, Honda hired over 350 blacks and women who had
earlier been denied employment. 0  Honda paid a settlement in 1987
of $460,000 in back pay to eighty-five people in connection with an
EEOC investigation of age discrimination.' 8 ' After paying these set-
tlements, Honda prepared an internal report on U.S. racial issues. The
Honda report cited Japanese investment in South Africa and the ab-
sence of Honda minority dealership programs.8 2 Honda Vice Presi-
dent for North American Operations, Tetsuo Chino, has vowed that
175. Douglas Williamson & Brian Bannon, Japanese Bias Comes to Light in Hiring Plans,
WINDSOR STAR SPECIAL REPORT: JOBS 2000, Oct. 29, 1987, at 17.
176. Cole & Deskins, supra note 104, at 18. This problem of minority avoidance in site
selection is not solely a practice of foreign firms. During discovery for a recent civil suit, corre-
spondence of the defendant surfaced in which it had told an industrial development expert that it
wanted to locate in an area where the minority population was under 33%. Industrial recruiters
and researchers in several states, notably Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama, have concurred
that this was and still is a practice used by a number of firms. Reginald Stuart, Business Said to
Have Barred New Plants in Largely Black Communities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1983, at A14.
177. James B. Treece, What the Japanese Must Learn About Racial Tolerance, Bus. WK.,
Sept. 5, 1988, at 41. This brochure was rewritten after Nomura discovered that some Americans
might consider the brochure offensive. Id.
178. Cole & Deskins, supra note 104, at 18. Cole & Deskins report that a possible reason
that the Japanese prefer California as a site of investment is their desire to replicate the successful
work and labor conditions found in Japan. Id. Japanese investment is essential to and actively
sought after by many states. Tennessee Governor Ned McWherter recently stated, "[Japan] is
what our future is all about." Carla Rapoport, The Big Split, FORTUNE, May 6, 1991, at 38, 40.
179. John L. Graham, Honda Learns Late About Bias, But It Is Not Alone, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
31, 1988, § II, at 7.
180. Ronald E. Roel, Japanese Firm Settles Suit by U.S. Employees, NEWSDAY, Nov. 9,
1990, at 47.
181. Hisayoshi Iwamitsu, 'Equal Opportunity' May Be New for Foreign Companies in US.,
INVESTOR'S DAILY, Aug. 9, 1990, at 13.
182. Carla Rapoport, Japan's Growing Global Reach, FORTUNE, May 22, 1989, at 48, 52.
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Honda will hire more women and blacks.18 3
Similarly, Nissan paid ninety-two people $600,000 to settle an
EEOC investigation in 1989. The ninety-two individuals (women,
blacks, Hispanics, and people over forty years of age) alleged that they
had been denied employment, denied promotion, or had been termi-
nated on the basis of their race, sex, or age.18 4
Another Japanese company that has been investigated by the
EEOC is Recruit Company. Recruit operates two employment agen-
cies in the United States: Recruit USA and Interplace/Transworld
Recruit. 8 5 The EEOC, assisted by former Recruit staffers, uncovered
a "shocking pattern of race, sex, national origin, and age discrimina-
tion." 186 According to the EEOC, the Recruit operation utilized code
words to designate the preferred race of a job candidate. For example,
the notation "see Adam" on a Recruit document means send the client
a white man, while "talk to Haruo" designates a preference for a Japa-
nese candidate. 187 On March 11, 1991, the EEOC filed suit against
Recruit for sex, race, national origin, and age discrimination. 88
Similarly, Hitachi Consumer Products of America was charged by
the California Fair Employment and Housing Department with race
discrimination in hiring. California investigators found a Hitachi
work force that was 50% Asian and 25% black in Compton, Califor-
nia, in an area where 75% of the residents are black and only 1.7% are
Asian. 8 9
Recently, in a questionable action, Japan-based Ricoh Corporation
dismissed a group of midlevel managers and workers at a San Jose,
California plant as part of a reduction of its workforce. Despite this
reduction, however, no Japanese managers or employees were laid
off.' 90 EEOC investigators have determined that the incident at the
California Ricoh facility "was tainted with national origin bias," and
that less-qualified Japanese employees had been retained or promoted
in lieu of qualified U.S. employees.' 9 ' The EEOC also concluded that
the dismissed Ricoh plaintiffs had reasonable cause to warrant legal
183. Id.
184. Iwamitsu, supra note 181, at 13.
185. Michele Galen & Leah J. Nathans, 'White People, Black People' Not Wanted Here?,
Bus. WK., July 10, 1989, at 31.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Recruit Gets in Trouble in the U.S., Bus. WK., Mar. 25, 1991, at 36.
189. Business Feels the Heat of US. Antibias Laws, Bus. WK., Nov. 23, 1981, at 57, 58.
190. Peter T. Kilborn, Americans Complain of Bias by Japanese Bosses in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 1991, at B6.
191. Id.
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action. 92
Other Japanese firms that face lawsuits alleging race or national
origin discrimination include Fujitsu Systems of America, Dai-Ichi
Kangyo Bank, and Matsushita-Quasar. 193 Even video-game giant
Nintendo finds itself the defendant in a race discrimination action filed
by twenty-six black Americans in Seattle, Washington. 194
Lawsuits have been multiplying so rapidly that Congress has be-
come interested in investigating how well foreign-owned companies
comply with equal opportunity and non-discrimination laws. The
House Government Operations Subcommittee on Employment and
Housing held hearings in August 1991 on the topic.195 Several former
employees of Japanese-owned firms testified. One employee of Toyota
Techical Center, who had been employed there for ten years, was de-
nied promotion to general manager of administration because, he al-
leges, he had opposed differential treatment of U.S. staff. 196 He noted
that the firm had created dual management positions in which a U.S.
and a Japanese employee filled the same position, and the U.S. em-
ployee reported to the Japanese employee. 197
Another employee, a black woman, testified that she was fired after
eighteen months with Sanwa Bank of California. Her supervisor re-
portedly told her "the reason blacks [can't] get ahead [is] because
[blacks are] lazy."' 198
NEC Corporation was criticized by Representative Tom Lantos
(D-Cal.), who chairs the subcommittee, for having only one U.S. citi-
zen out of seven top employees and only one minority employee out of
170 middle managers. 199
2. Japanese Discriminatory Lending Practices
Foreign-owned banks presently control approximately 21.5% of
all U.S. banking assets, including 58% of all bank assets in New York
and 33% of all bank assets in California. 2°° Given the business prac-
192. Id.
193. Sandy Hock, Japanese Bank Discriminates, Suit Alleges, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Dec. 24,
1990, at 1.
194. Tim Healy, Are Japanese EmployersBiased or All Business - Nintendo, Other Compa-
nies Say Discrimination Charges Are Misunderstandings, SEATrLE TIMES, July 8, 1990, at El.
195. U.S. Workers Tell House Subcommittee of Discrimination by Japanese-Owned Firms,





200. Gene Koretz, Foreign Banks Stepping Up Their Siege, Bus. WK., June 3, 1991, at 20.
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tices developed above, it is not surprising to see that Japanese-owned
banks in the United States engage in discriminatory lending practices.
In addition to being sued by a former employee for race and national
origin discrimination in hiring, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank of Japan, the
largest bank in the world, has been charged with discriminatory lend-
ing practices. Former employees of the bank reported that bank pol-
icy required loan officers to treat any loan application by a Hispanic
person as "high risk," despite proven ability to pay or adequate
collateral. 20 1
The allegations of discriminatory lending at Dai-Ichi Kangyo
come at the same time as allegations of "redlining" by other Japanese
banks. "Redlining" refers to a commercial lending practice of mark-
ing certain geographic areas as "too risky" for loans. 20 2 Recently, the
San Francisco-based Greenlining Coalition20 3 urged Japanese banks in
California to make appropriate commitments and develop a nondis-
criminatory lending policy. 204 As a result, when Japanese-controlled
California First purchased Union Bank, the new entity subsequently
invested some $42 million in depressed areas. The bank also agreed to
name minorities and women to its board. 20 5 In 1989 Union Bank
made $59 million in loans to low-income projects and develop-
ments.20 6 Robert Gnaizda, legal counsel to the Greenlining Coalition,
claims these loans are a victory for the Coalition, but bank officials
deny that their decision was influenced by the Coalition. 20 7
The Coalition's efforts seek bank adherence to the Community Re-
investment Act of 1977 (CRA) which mandates that "[flederal finan-
cial supervisory agenc[ies] assess the institution's record of meeting
the credit needs of its entire community, including low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operation
of such institution. ' 20 8 Federal regulators are required to "take such
201. See Hock, supra note 193, at I. Dai-Ichi Kangyo officials are also alleged to have char-
acterized a loan with a U.S. government guarantee as high risk due to their perception that the
U.S. government was bankrupt. Id.
202. Japanese Banks: Yellow, Black Red and Green, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17-23, 1990, at 24.
203. The Greenlining Coalition is a diverse community-action group founded in 1979. The
Coalition's goals are to forge partnerships between corporations and women, minorities, and the
poor. See George Dean & Robert Gnaizda, Greenlining: An Equal-Opportunity, Grass-Roots
Antidote to Redlining, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1990, at M5.
204. Id. Under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, as a condition of merger ap-
proval banks must lend their funds in the areas where their depositors reside. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-
05 (1989).
205. Dean & Gnaizda, supra note 203, at M5.
206. Jan Shaw, Banks Discover Reinvestment Act Not To Be Ignored, S.F. Bus. TIMES, Apr.
2, 1990, at 11. The Bank of Tokyo owns 77% of Union Bank.
207. Dean & Gnaizda, supra note 203, at M5.
208. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988).
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record into account" when evaluating "application[s] for a deposit fa-
cility" by financial institutions. 20 9 The goal of the CRA is to "require
each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to use its au-
thority when examining financial institutions, [and] to encourage such
institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in
which they are chartered. '210
Under the CRA, federally-chartered banks are evaluated by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,211 while state-chartered
Federal Reserve member banks and holding companies are evaluated
by the Federal Reserve. 212 CRA compliance by state-chartered banks
and savings banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve is
monitored by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,21 3 while
CRA compliance by savings associations and savings and loan holding
companies is monitored by the Office of Thrift Supervision.214 CRA
compliance is evaluated under five categories: ascertainment of com-
munity credit needs; marketing and types of credit offered and ex-
tended; geographic distribution and record of opening and closing
offices; discrimination and other illegal credit practices; and commu-
nity development. 215 The financial institutions are assigned ratings of
outstanding, satisfactory, needs to improve, or substantial noncompli-
ance based upon their CRA evaluations. 216 These written evaluations
and ratings may be disclosed to the public.217
Given the increased focus on CRA compliance and the visibility of
international lenders, it was not surprising that the U.S. operations of
Mitsui Bank Ltd. came under the scrutiny of federal regulators and
the Greenlining Coalition. 21 8 The Coalition maintains that Mitsui
Bank has been unwilling to lend to minorities in violation of
the CRA.21 9 On February 22, 1990, representatives of several
209. Id.
210. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988).
211. 12 C.F.R. § 25.1 (1991).
212. 12 C.F.R. § 228 (1991).
213. 12 C.F.R. § 345 (1991).
214. 12 C.F.R. § 563e (1991).
215. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Uniform Interagency Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act Final Guidelines for Disclosure of Written Evaluations and Revised As-
sessment Rating System, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,163, at 18,167 (1990).
216. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2906(b)(2) (West 1989).
217. Id. For a detailed analysis of the CRA, see Robert C. Art, Social Responsibility in Bank
Credit Decisions: The Community Reinvestment Act One Decade Later, 18 PAC. LJ. 1071 (1987);
see also WARREN W. TRAIGER, FEDERAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT (CRA) COMPLI-
ANCE (1990), available in Westlaw, JLR file.
218. Dean & Gnaizda, supra note 203, at MS.
219. Peter F. Blackman, Bank Merger May be Affected by Lending Protests, L.A. Bus. J.,
Mar. 5, 1990, at 3.
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community-action organizations protested the proposed merger of
Mitsui Bank and Mitsui Manufacturers Bank and urged the Federal
Reserve to block this transaction. 220 Activists also picketed the offices
of Taiyo Kobe Bank, Mitsui's merger partner.221
Mitsui representatives stated that the bank "has met its CRA obli-
gation and has a good record of meeting community credit needs. '222
According to Jerry W. Johnston, president of Mitsui Manufacturers,
"[the bank] lend[s] basically to small- and medium-sized businesses
* . . [which] are as important a credit need to serve as single-family
mortgage lending. ' 223 Johnston believes that Japanese banks are un-
fairly targeted by protestors and community groups who focus on the
size of the bank's international operations "even though CRA has no
extraterritorial authority. '224 Johnston asserts that "[t]he activists are
asking Mitsui to take deposits out of Japan and lend here, and that
exactly fits the definition of redlining, which the CRA was originally
directed against. ' 225 Mitsui, nevertheless, agreed to meet with the Co-
alition and other activists and admitted that its CRA compliance
could be improved.226
Although the Federal Reserve approved the transaction permitting
Mitsui to acquire the New York trust unit of Taiyo Kobe Bank, Mit-
sui was put on notice of its failure to comply with the CRA.227 The
Federal Reserve noted that Mitsui's application to convert the New
York trust unit of Taiyo Kobe Bank into a bank would warrant a
review of Mitsui's CRA noncompliance. 228 True to its word, the Fed-
eral Reserve announced a hearing to review CRA compliance in De-
cember 1990.229 The Greenlining Coalition applauded this action by
the Federal Reserve. According to the Coalition's Executive Director,
John Gamboa, this was only the second public hearing granted by the
Federal Reserve although over 300 public hearings had been requested
220. Id. The Federal Reserve has the power to review proposed mergers of banks and to
assess compliance with the CRA. Id.
221. Jill Stewart, Activists Oppose Bank Merger, L.A. TiMES, Feb. 23, 1990, at B3.
222. Blackman, supra note 219, at 3. Mitsui Bank points out that it donated $1 million to
the California Community Reinvestment Corporation (CCRC). The CCRC is a consortium of
46 banks, capitalized at $100 million, that operates as a blind lending pool offering loans below






227. Sam Zuckerman, Fed Faults CRA Record of Mitsui, AM. BANKER, Mar. 30, 1990, at 2.
228. Id.
229. See Linda Corman, Fed Sets Rare Open Hearing on Mitsui Unit's CRA Steps, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 20, 1990, at 2.
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previously.230  Simultaneously, the House Banking Committee,
chaired by Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tex.), announced a
planned hearing on CRA compliance3 a' Mitsui President Johnston
denounced the hearings, stating, "I think it's in the nature of a polit-
ical circus. ' 232 While Mitsui maintained this disdain even after the
hearings, claiming they "did not find [the hearing] terribly edify-
ing, ' 233 Federal Reserve representatives believe the meetings were
quite informative.234
Representatives of the New York-based Taiyo Kobe altered its ini-
tial cold-shoulder response and consented to meet with the New York
Reinvestment Alliance over the CRA compliance issue. 235 Yasuo
Takata, First President of Taiyo Kobe, asserted that the decision to
meet with the Alliance was not motivated by the specter of Federal
Reserve hearings. 236 Although no agreement was reached by the par-
ties regarding Taiyo Kobe's lending policy, Mr. Takata stressed that
"[Taiyo Kobe was] trying to keep in contact with [the Alliance]. '23 7
3. Japanese Discriminatory Business Practices
In drawing attention to discriminatory Japanese business practices,
it is logical to also cite the paucity of minority-owned Japanese car
dealerships and electronics franchises. Eddie Williams, Director of
the Center for Political and Economic Studies of Washington, D.C.,
states that there are only six minority-owned Japanese car dealer-
ships.238 Williams echoes the earlier observations of Jesse Jackson.
Jackson, while visiting Japan in 1986, informed Prime Minister
Nakasone and officials of Toyota that "[the United States] essentially
230. Fed Orders Public Hearing to Examine Japanese Banks' Performance Under CRA,
Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 25, at 1019 (Dec. 24, 1990). Bob Moore, Federal Reserve spokesman,
acknowledged that these hearings were rare, but compared the process to "something along the
lines of a town meeting in New England, a chance to look at the issues." Id.
231. Corman, supra note 229, at 2.
232. Id.
233. See Teresa Carson, Community Relations: Open Meetings Suit Activists But Bankers
Have Doubt, AM. BANKER, Apr. 15, 1991, at 5. Mitsui President Johnston reported that "there
was very little in the way of factual material presented." Id.
234. According to Kelly Walsh, Community Affairs Officer of the Federal Reserve in San
Francisco, "[tihe board left with a lot more information than it went in with." Linda Corman,




238. Toth, supra, note 124, at A6. The National Association of Minority Automobile Deal-
ers reports that there is only one minority owner of a Nissan dealership in the United States.
This constitutes 0.1% of the total number of Nissan dealers in the United States. Cole & Des-
kins, supra note 104, at 19. Out of all the Association's 250 dealership members, only 20 im-
ported car dealerships are owned by blacks.'Treece, supra note 100, at 41.
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[has] no black [Japanese] auto dealerships or electronics dealer-
ships."' 239 Jackson charged Japanese firms with the "redlining" of mi-
nority firms, accusing the Japanese of demonstrating "total
insensitivity to the legitimate business quests" of U.S. women and mi-
norities.240 Jackson threatened a black boycott of Japanese goods un-
less a "new relationship" was created.241
4. Japanese Insensitivity Regarding Apartheid
Japanese trade with and investment in South Africa is another
source of complaints for many Americans and is further evidence of
Japanese racist attitudes. Japan is currently the largest trading part-
ner of South Africa.242 The rise of Japanese trade with South Africa
undermines U.S. foreign policy as embodied in the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.243 Under the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act, countries that enter into commerce with South Africa
to take the place of trade that had existed previously between U.S. and
South African firms face U.S. trade sanctions. 244 Japanese govern-
ment officials claim to be embarrassed by the Japan-South Africa trade
trends and maintain that they have "put pressure on companies to
decrease trade, but [that] the final decision is up to them. '245 In re-
sponse to the rise in trade between Japan and South Africa, Jesse Jack-
son warned Japanese companies doing business in both the United
States and South Africa; he stated flatly, "[Y]ou cannot have access to
both markets."'2 "
B. Japanese Discrimination Against Women in the United States
U.S. women have also fared poorly in dealing with Japanese com-
panies in the United States. 247 A study by the University of Michigan
239. Burgess, supra note 115, at A30.
240. Clyde Haberman, Jackson Cautions Japanese on Bias, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1986, at A7.
241. Id. Jackson warned that if the Japanese failed to ameliorate the situation, "[blacks
would] organize to end the relationship." Id. Toyota has taken steps to improve this situation
and now has four black-owned dealerships. Toyota also contributes to the United Negro College
Fund and utilizes black suppliers. Treece, supra note 100, at 40.
242. Ted Holden et al., Japan's Embarrassment of Riches in South Africa, Bus. WK., Feb. 1,
1988, at 44.
243. 22 U.S.C. § 5001 (1988).
244. Id., §§ 5082, 5083. The rise of Japanese trade with South Africa is curious due to the
Japanese ban on direct investment in South Africa and restrictions on commercial loans to South
African businesses. See Holden et al., supra note 242, at 44.
245. Holden et al., supra note 242, at 44.
246. Burgess, supra note 115, at A30. The Jackson warning made in 1986 has apparently
gone unheeded by Japanese firms, as evidenced by the rise in Japan-South African trade.
247. It is important to note here that although- Japanese firms discriminate against women
here and abroad, both male and female Americans have not, in general, been included in the
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found that Japanese firms discriminate against women in the
workforce and do not allow women to have significant responsibility in
Japanese corporations. 248
The glass ceiling that many U.S. women confront when dealing
with Japanese employers is best exemplified by the landmark decision
in Sumitomo v. Avagliano.249 In Avagliano, a class of thirteen U.S.
women sued Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. asserting that
"Sumitomo's alleged practice of hiring only male Japanese citizens to
fill executive, managerial, and sales positions violated both 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' ' 250 In defense of its prac-
tices, Sumitomo relied on Japan's Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion Treaty with the United States. 251 Sumitomo asserted that its
practices were permitted 252 under the treaty, which states that "com-
panies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territo-
ries of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts,
executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their
choice. ' 25 3 However, Sumitomo's interpretation of the Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaty creates a conflict with Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, or national origin. 254 JETRO filed an amicus brief
asserting that applying Title VII to Sumitomo would thwart the spirit
of the Treaty and "undercut ... the ability of Japanese investors to
control the key personnel who manage their investments in the United
States."255
The U.S. Supreme Court held against Sumitomo, stating that
"Sumitomo is 'constituted under the applicable laws and regulations
of New York'; based on Article XXII(3), it is a company of the United
management of Japanese companies. For example, at Sumitomo Bank of California, 11 of 13 top
officials have Japanese surnames. This may include some Japanese American employees. Simi-
larly, the Bank of Tokyo Trust Company in New York has Japanese officers in over 60% of its
top positions. Kilborn, supra note 190, at AI, B6.
248. James Risen, Americans at Japanese Firms Lacking Power, Study Finds, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1989, at D2.
249. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
250. 457 U.S. at 178.
251. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 4 U.S.T.
2063.
252. 457 U.S. at 181.
253. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 251, art. VIII(l).
254. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988).
255. Decision in Sumitomo Case Will Influence Foreign Investment, Supreme Court Told,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at 518 (Mar. 3, 1982). JETRO also maintained that the




States, not a company of Japan. ' 256 Thus, as a New York company,
Sumitomo could not seek refuge under the Treaty for its discrimina-
tory practices. 257
It took Sumitomo five years to settle the Avagliano lawsuit. Fi-
nally, in 1987 Sumitomo agreed to pay $2.8 million to "finance a $1
million training program [for women employees], make $1 million to-
tal in cash payments to past and current [women] employees, offer
$375,000 total in promotional incentives, pay $15,000 to each of the
thirteen plaintiffs . . . , [and] give workers a 16.5 percent wage in-
crease. '258 The agreement gave Sumitomo three years to implement
the plan and develop "'Americanized' job titles and descriptions. '25 9
Sumitomo also vowed to fill 23 to 25% of its management and sales
positions with women. 260 Today, Sumitomo denies any wrongdoing
and maintains that these changes reflect its decision to "Americanize"
its U.S. subsidiary as part of a "world-wide localization" of its
subsidiaries. 26'
Sumitomo, however, is not the only Japanese investor that holds
discriminatory attitudes toward women. For example, at Mitsubishi
International, one of the world's largest trading companies, Personnel
Manager Kazuaki Hikida, observed that "[w]omen don't expect to
compete with men in Japan. ' 262 Hikida has expressed his belief that
the nature of being a trader at Mitsubishi "involves entertaining a
great many foreign visitors. This may mean going out drinking with
them, or even taking them to see a movie on Forty-Second Street.
Most women don't want to do that. '' 263 This kind of attitude contrib-
utes to the inability of women to advance at many Japanese firms. 264
Women employees at C. Itoh Company have reported Sumitomo-
like problems at work. In a lawsuit that was filed on November 10,
1986 in the Southern District of New York, three women charged C.
Itoh. Co. with sex discrimination. 265 Plaintiffs claimed that they were
256. 457 U.S. at 182.
257. Id. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Department of State agreed
that subsidiaries of foreign companies incorporated under the law of a U.S. state were not pro-
tected by article VIII(l) of the Treaty. Id. at 183.
258. Barbara Goldberg, American Women in Japanese Company Win 'Clash of Cultures'
Suit, UPI, Jan. 8, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
259. Id.
260. Id. Nearly half of the 500 Sumitomo employees in the United States are women. Id.
261. Id. Lewis Steel, attorney for the plaintiffs, asserted that this case "mirrored the history
of the way women were treated in Japan." Id.
262. Tamar Lewin, Sex Bias or Clash of Cultures, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 8, 1982, at DI, D6.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Douglas Frantz, Japanese Unaccustomed to Either; Roles of Working Women, Minori-
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not given staff members and had to do their own clerical work, not
given business cards, and not introduced to the bankers with whom
they talked on the phone. In July 1990 the court certified a plaintiff
class consisting of all past and present female employees of C. Itoh's
New York office since 198 1.266
Similarly, women employees at Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd. brought a
case in the Southern District of New York claiming that the bank de-
nied them opportunities for promotion and relegated trained women
analysts to working as administrative assistants. 267 The women plain-
tiffs in the case reported being informed that "promotional opportuni-
ties and advancements were reserved for Japanese personnel. '268 The
plaintiffs complained that "the work environment, being totally con-
trolled by Japanese managers, was infected with frequent racial re-
marks asserting the lack of ability, loyalty and commitment of non-
Japanese personnel. '269 Mitsubishi Bank officials defended the pro-
motion practices and asserted that familiarity with Japanese language,
business culture, and management style are all essential for promo-
tion.270 The plaintiffs disputed this assertion, claiming that "the pri-
mary mission of the New York branch has become to provide primary
lending for American-based and other non-Japanese corporations."'271
In this case the court held that the women plaintiffs "established a
prima facie pattern of discrimination based on distinctions between the
local and rotating staff.'" 272 Judge Sifton observed, "[T]he records in-
dicate that the Japanese in the rotating staff have far more promotion
opportunities than similarly situated employees in the local staff.' 273
The court determined that
[p]laintiffs have also made a prima facie case that the Bank has an im-
plicit policy of reserving all high level positions in the New York office
ties Pose Challenge, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1988, at AI, A15. One C. Itoh employee described the
Japanese as engaging in "a benign, friendly sort of discrimination." Id. See also Sex Discrimina-
tion Case Filed against C Itoh, Reuter Library Report, Feb. 27, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, REUTER File.
266. Mikel Duffy et al. v. C. Itoh & Co., No. 86-C8598, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9085
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1990).
267. Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
268. 751 F. Supp. at 1552-53.
269. Id. at 1553.
270. Id. Hisao Yokoyama, Chief Manager of Mitsubishi Bank's General Affairs Depart-
ment, asserts that there is no company restriction on promoting non-Japanese employees. How-
ever, Mr. Yokoyama states that to be promoted, it would be necessary to "acquire knowledge of
Japanese culture, social structure and related Japanese institutions." Id.
271. Id. at 1554.
272. Id. at 1561. The rotating staff at Mitsubishi receives training and promotions. This is




and most management positions for Japanese employees. While Japa-
nese language and business skills may well be a legitimate requirement
for many of these positions ... the Bank has not demonstrated that there
is a legitimate business reason that the vast majority of management po-
sitions be reserved for the rotating staff.2 7 4
Recently, similar allegations of sex and race discrimination were
raised in an action against Nikko Securities. 275 Plaintiffs asserted that
only Japanese males receive promotions to officer or upper-echelon
status and that women are restricted to working in administrative as-
sistant positions.276 Nikko was also accused of "maintaining a com-
pany-wide atmosphere of discrimination based on sex, race and
national origin."'277
III. REMEDIAL PROGRAMS As A CONDITION OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT
The previous discussion examined problems facing women and mi-
norities who work in enterprises owned by Japanese investors. For-
eign direct investment is a privilege extended to the foreign investor.
Capital from international investors is welcomed as a benefit to the
host State. However, although this foreign capital is welcome, the rac-
ist and sexist practices of some multinational corporations are not.
Unlike protectionists who seek to limit future foreign direct invest-
ment on national security or reciprocity grounds, I favor an open in-
vestment policy. However, such a policy should include the condition
that foreign investors behave in a manner consistent with U.S. policies.
Accordingly, I propose that legislation be enacted to address concerns
that are common to both foreign investors and U.S. citizens. This leg-
islation would condition future foreign direct investment by multina-
tional corporations on their provision of employment, training,
promotion, and investment opportunities to women and minorities,
above and beyond what is required by existing law.
Legislation such as this is neither radical nor unduly burdensome.
The landmark Investment Canada Act of 1985278 established Invest-
ment Canada 279 - an agency to review potential foreign direct invest-
274. Id.
275. Ross v. Nikko Sec. Co. Int'l, 133 F.R.D. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
276. Id.
277. Id. The Nikko case was dismissed as a class action despite the allegations of female
MBAs and other professionals who were denied promotions and employed as secretaries. Id.
278. Investment Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. 28, §§ 1-51 (1985) (Can.).
279. Id., ch. 28, § 6.
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ment in Canada. 280 In enacting this legislation, the Canadian
parliament "recogniz[ed] that increased capital and technology would
benefit Canada."'281 However, the government believed that this legis-
lation was necessary "to encourage investment in Canada by Canadi-
ans and non-Canadians that contributes to economic growth and
employment opportunities and to provide for the review of significant
investments in Canada by non-Canadians in order to ensure such ben-
efit to Canada. '282
Pursuant to the Investment Canada Act, the Investment Canada
Agency evaluates prospective foreign direct investment according to
several considerations. The factors to be considered include: "the
compatibility of the investment with national industrial, economic and
cultural policies, taking into consideration industrial, economic and
cultural policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature
of any province likely to be significantly affected by the invest-
ment. ' 283 The Act also requires the Investment Canada agency to
consider "the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in
the Canadian business or new Canadian business and in any industry
or industries in Canada of which the Canadian business or new Cana-
dian business forms or would form a part. '284
Such a review would not constitute an unfair barrier to trade and
investment. According to the recently released report on Unfair
Trade Policies and Practices by the Japanese Fair Trade Center, the
Investment Canada program has not presented any problems for Japa-
nese firms and Japanese investment in Canada has risen steadily since
its enactment. 285
280. George C. Glover et al., The Investment Canada Act. A New Approach to the Regulation
of Foreign Investment in Canada, 41 Bus. LAW. 83 (1985).
281. Investment Canada Act, supra note 278, ch. 28, § 2.
282. Id.
283. Id., ch. 28, § 2 0(e).
284. Id., ch. 28, § 20(b). Other factors that must be evaluated pursuant to the act are:
(a) the effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity in Canada,
including .... the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the utilization of parts,
components and services produced in Canada and on exports from Canada;
(c) the effect of the investment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological develop-
ment, product innovation and product variety in Canada;
(d) the effect of the investment on competition within any industry or industries in
Canada;
.... [and]
(f) the contribution of the investment to Canada's ability to compete in world markets.
Id., ch. 28, § 20.
285. JAPAN FAIR TRADE CENTER, REPORT ON UNFAIR TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES:
TRADE BARRIERS AND GATT OBLIGATIONS IN THE U.S., E.C. AND CANADA (1991).
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The United States has similar legislation that requires a review of
foreign direct investment on national security grounds; this legislation
is the Exon-Florio Act. 286 An interagency group, the Committee for
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), currently makes
this national security evaluation. There have recently been moves to
broaden Exon-Florio.287 Due to the shift in emphasis in evaluating
foreign investment proposed here, however, a new interagency group
should be fashioned to consider these concerns.
Enactment and application of similar legislation will allow the
United States to continue to welcome foreign direct investment while
requiring that this investment be consistent with U.S. domestic and
international policies. Furthermore, making foreign direct investment
conditional on the participation of women and minorities in the new
enterprises will support equal opportunity for all in foreign direct
investment.
Under the legislation I propose, prospective foreign direct invest-
ment would also be evaluated as to the investor's prior investment
practices abroad and in domestic markets. If it is determined by the
Department of Commerce that the prospective investor has supported
the boycott of Israel, or has supported apartheid, or has violated wo-
men's or workers' rights internationally, future investment by this
multinational corporation may be either denied, or conditioned upon
remedial action by the company. For example, assume that Honda
wished to make an additional investment in the United States by
286. The Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (West 1991).
287. On August 2, 1991, Congress passed H.R. 991, The Defense Production Act Extension
and Amendments of 1991. This act will revive the Defense Production Act (DPA) until Septem-
ber 30, 1991 while permanently reauthorizing the Exon-Florio provision. Another bill, H.R.
3039, The Defense Production Act Amendments of 1991, also contains provisions to reauthorize
Exon-Florio but only for a three year term. An additional amendment to the DPA included in
H.R. 3039 would require the Department of the Treasury and other agencies to analyze and
report to Congress foreign direct investment in the United States, especially acquisitions involv-
ing "critical technologies." The classified report would be presented to Congress on the one year
anniversary of the DPA reauthorization and every four years thereafter.
As a further expression of congressional dissatisfaction with Exon-Florio and CFIUS, Repre-
sentative Collins (D-Ill.) introduced H.R. 2624, The Technology Preservation Act of 1991, on
June 12, 1991. This legislation would require CFIUS to investigate "any acquisition of a U.S.
company involving 'critical technology.' " CFIUS would also be required to "solicit appropriate
assurances" from foreign investors purchasing this technology. These assurances would include
"commitments to maintain production and research and development in the United States, and
not disrupt supplies to U.S. customers." Other changes to Exon-Florio under the proposed bill
would transfer the chairmanship of CFIUS to the Secretary of Commerce and replace the Chair-
man of the Council of Economic Advisers and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget with the Secretary of Energy, the National Security Adviser, and the Presidential Adviser
for Science and Technology. Pursuant to this legislation, the President would be able to "nul-
lify" transactions which impaired national security and "restore such parties to the positions they
held before."
Another bill, S. 347, would also amend the Defense Production Act and permanently
reauthorize Exon-Florio.
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building another facility or purchasing a U.S.-owned plant. The pro-
posed act would require that Honda adopt a plan to hire, train, and
promote minorities and women as a condition of the new investment.
Similarly, after the Sumitomo Shoji settlement, Sumitomo would
be required to announce steps that it planned to take in existing and
prospective U.S. operations before undertaking any additional invest-
ment in the United States. Approval of this plan by an interagency
group consisting of representatives from the EEOC, the Department
of Commerce, the USTR, the Department of Justice, and the Depart-
ment of the Treasury would be required before the investment could
be made.
Foreign-controlled banks that have been found to engage in "red-
lining" would also face possible restriction of future investment oppor-
tunities in the United States. The CRA has already been utilized to
address some problems of "redlining." However, the proposed statute
would provide additional incentives to foreign-controlled banks to
curb these practices and would shift the enforcement burden from
community groups like the Greenlining Coalition to the federal gov-
ernment. If enacted, such legislation would deter foreign banks from
"redlining" by increasing the risk of government intervention and the
denial of future investment opportunities.
An argument can be made that this proposed legislation is not nec-
essary in light of the litigation that has taken place and will likely
continue to take place under Title VII. According to this argument,
the lawsuits and the attendant publicity will give the Japanese inves-
tors an incentive to change their discriminatory practices. However,
the news of these lawsuits does not always reach the shareholders of
the corporate parent in Japan. Additionally, due to the impact of the
keiretsu system of corporate interlocking shareownership in Japan, the
offending firms will not be sensitive or vulnerable to criticism.288 The
fact that Nomura, Sumitomo, and other investment giants control the
majority of publicly traded securities in Japan supports this argument.
With large banks and investment companies able to influence the stock
prices of these companies, the loss of several million dollars in dam-
ages may not necessarily be felt in Japan.
One example where noneconomic concerns have stopped foreign
direct investment in the United States in the past is the denial of per-
mission to U.K.-based BTR, PLC from purchasing Norton Company
of Massachusetts. In this case, BTR was not allowed to purchase Nor-
ton because BTR had large investments in South Africa. Citing a dis-
288. For an explanation of the keiretsu system, see Mighty Mitsubishi is on the Move, supra
note 166, at 98-101.
[Vol. 13:1
Unwelcome Imports
turbing pattern of labor policies in South Africa, Representative
Dellums (D-Cal.) warned President Bush that allowing BTR, PLC to
expand its operations in the United States might cause "a potential
backlash from African countries with whom the United States 'has
vital political and economic interests.' ",289
Thus, the conditioning of future direct investment on the inclusion
of women and minorities in these new investments is a logical coales-
cence of U.S. domestic policy goals and foreign investment. As the
global economy becomes a reality, issues not traditionally considered
"trade issues" have become significantly more important in interna-
tional trade and investment. Notable examples are the increased im-
portance of the protection of intellectual property and the protection
of the environment in world trade. 29° We can no longer ignore dis-
criminatory practices by foreign direct investors in the United States,
for such discrimination hurts not only U.S. workers, but has global
repercussions by undermining equal participation by women and mi-
nority populations in the world economy and society.
The United States, in the past, has included the international pro-
tection of workers' rights in its trade agenda and has conditioned trade
benefits on the treatment accorded labor. For example, the United
States recently suspended the duty-free import privileges of the Sudan
under the Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) 29 1 because of
abuses of Sudanese workers' rights. 292 The GSP privileges of Benin,
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nepal were maintained after re-
view by the USTR determined that these countries were taking ade-
quate steps to protect workers' rights.293 Workers' rights in Israel and
Malaysia were also investigated under the GSP and found to be ade-
quately protected. 294 In addition, human rights abuses are at the
center of the recent congressional debate on extension of most-favored
289. Congressman Asks Bush to Block BTR's Takeover of Norton, CORP. FIN. WK., Apr. 23,
1990, at 6. Although these comments came during a debate on national security and foreign
investment, the sentiment may easily be applied to restrict future investment based on multina-
tional corporate practices that are inconsistent with U.S. domestic and foreign policy.
290. See UNITED STATES PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC REPORT 250 (Feb. 1991); A Political Tap
Dance to Preserve Fast-Track, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1991, at B6.
291. 19 U.S.C. § 2461-65 (1988). The Generalized System of Preferences is a U.S. govern-
ment program under which imports from beneficiary developing states enter the U.S. duty-free.
See SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION, ORGANIZATION OF AMERI-
CAN STATES, CARRIBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE 8 (1989).
292. Czechoslovakia Eligible For GSP Immediately, Sudan Benefits Cut For Worker's Rights
Abuses, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 649 (May 1, 1991). See also William H. Lash III,
Don't Reward China's Leaders, J. OF COM., June 4, 1991, at 8A.
293. Lash, supra note 291, at 8A. The USTR extended the review of the worker's rights
records of Bangladesh, El Salvador, and Syria. Id.
294. Israel's Duty-Free Status Retained, Central African Republic, Burma Suspended, USTR
Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 483 (Apr. 19, 1989).
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nation status to China.295 Accordingly, conditioning future invest-
ment in the United States on adherence to principles of women's rights
and nondiscrimination, and to the fight against apartheid and the boy-
cott of Israel, simply recognizes the importance that these issues have
for the United States and in world trade.
CONCLUSION
An open investment policy is an essential component of an inte-
grated and global economy. Under the correct circumstances, foreign
direct investment presents tremendous opportunity for the investor
and host State alike. The host State benefits from the increased em-
ployment opportunities, the infusion of capital, and the technology
that foreign investors provide. The foreign investor gains access to a
new market. Worldwide welfare benefits from the new relationship.
This model of foreign direct investment, however, is a benefit to
the host State and advances social welfare only if the investment is
consistent with the policies and national aspirations of the host State.
If the goals and behavior of the foreign investor prove to be incompati-
ble with the national aspirations of the host State, the intended mutual
benefits evaporate and are replaced by distrust, xenophobia, and even-
tually protectionism. While foreign capital is most welcome, exported
bigotries are not. The proposal described above may properly be char-
acterized as remedial in nature. Although it is designed to remedy
injustices caused by some foreign investors, it has another function.
The true goal of this proposal is to allow the United States to expand
foreign investors' understanding and appreciation of both the U.S. sys-
tem and the contribution that women and minorities may make to
their endeavors in the United States and elsewhere. The United States
has gained tremendously from foreign investment. Let us strive to bal-
ance our trade deficit with the contribution of understanding.
295. Lash, supra note 291, at 8A.
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